Evangelicals and politics in Brazil: the relevance of religious change in Latin America by Zilla, Claudia
www.ssoar.info
Evangelicals and politics in Brazil: the relevance of
religious change in Latin America
Zilla, Claudia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Zilla, C. (2020). Evangelicals and politics in Brazil: the relevance of religious change in Latin America. (SWP Research
Paper, 1/2020). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und
Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP01
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66881-6
  
 
SWP Research Paper 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs 
Claudia Zilla 
Evangelicals and Politics 
in Brazil 
The Relevance of Religious Change in Latin America 
 
 
SWP Research Paper 1 
January 2020, Berlin 
  
Abstract 
∎ Since the 1970s a religious change has occurred in Latin America. As a 
proportion of the population, Catholics have greatly diminished, and 
Evangelicals rapidly increased. These developments are causally linked. 
∎ In the course of this demographic transformation, the Catholic Church 
has lost its special position in society and its privileged access to politics. 
It has been replaced by a large number of diverse and autonomous Evan-
gelical churches, above all the Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal. 
∎ The substantial social weight of the Evangelical churches is connected, 
inter alia, to their importance as “problem solvers” in precarious sections 
of society. Faith communities are increasingly extending this commit-
ment into the political sphere. 
∎ The increasing social relevance and political power of the Evangelical 
churches has come to prominence in a particularly striking way in Brazil. 
Since 1 January 2019, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, a former soldier who was 
baptised in the Jordan by an Evangelical pastor, has been heading its 
government. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Evangelicals and Politics in Brazil.  
The Relevance of Religious Change 
in Latin America 
One of the most significant demographic transforma-
tions of the last decades in Latin America is the con-
version of large parts of the population from Catholi-
cism to different forms of Evangelicalism, in particu-
lar Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal (which represent 
the majority within this broad Protestant spectrum). 
Whereas in the 1970s, 92 per cent of Latin America’s 
population were Catholic and only 4 per cent Protes-
tant, by 2014 19 per cent of believers stated that they 
belonged to a Protestant church, while the proportion 
of Catholics had fallen to 69 per cent. In the Central 
American countries of Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, Protestants, most of them Evangelicals, 
now make up around 40 percent of the population. 
What implications does this development have at 
the social and political-institutional levels? Is the in-
creasing demographic weight of Evangelicals in Latin 
America accompanied by a rise in social relevance 
and political power? And if so, how is the interaction 
between Evangelical churches and politics structured? 
What role do Evangelical leaders and believers play in 
politics? How do they articulate religious and political 
interests? These questions are addressed by this re-
search paper. 
While the analysis of the demographic and social 
rise of Evangelicals refers to the whole of Latin Ameri-
ca, the specific political implications of the develop-
ment are examined in more detail in a national case 
study: Brazil. Although Brazil is still the country with 
the most Catholics in the world, it has also become 
the largest Pentecostal country. Whilst Evangelicals 
are still underrepresented in Brazilian politics com-
pared to Catholics, their popularity has been growing 
– not least because of the inauguration on 1 January 
2019 of the new President, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, a 
military officer who was Evangelically baptised in the 
Jordan River. 
This research paper comes to the following conclu-
sions: the enormous expansion of Evangelicalism 
initially had an impact on the subjective individual 
attitudes of citizens. These included not only religious 
beliefs and values, but also their worldview. Within 
Evangelicalism, one’s unique religious identity gen-
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erally plays a much more central role than in Catholi-
cism. Personal experiences of God and conscious 
decisions lead the followers of these churches to con-
vert or profess their faith. Their Evangelical identity 
therefore shapes their way of life to a greater extent 
than Catholicism would. 
The demographic rise of Evangelical churches is 
accompanied by an increasing loss of importance of 
the once-dominant Catholic Church. This changes the 
balance of power between the most important reli-
gious actors in civil society. However, this is a shift of 
power not only from one denomination to the other, 
but also from a strongly centralised church to an 
atomised landscape of myriad, extremely autono-
mous Evangelical faith communities, which cannot 
be addressed as a homogeneous whole. A further 
consequence of this development is that religious and 
actor pluralism are increasing in society. Evangelical 
churches dominate in urban centres as much as in 
slums and remote villages. They are present where 
the state is absent and the Catholic Church has left 
room. Large Evangelical churches operate like com-
mercial enterprises. They have significant shares of 
the so-called gospel market and have extensive media 
networks. 
In Brazil, the political arena is dominated by three 
Evangelical mega-churches: the Igreja Universal do 
Reino de Deus (Universal Church of the Kingdom of 
God), the Assembleia de Deus (Assembly of God) and 
the Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular (Church of the 
Foursquare Gospel). While their members are in-
volved in several parties, the Partido Republicano 
Brasileiro (Republican Party) and the Partido Social 
Cristão (Social Christian Party) are particularly in-
fluenced by these churches. Evangelicals are more 
strongly represented on the right and centre-right of 
the ideological spectrum, though not exclusively. 
The primary political strategy of major Evangelical 
churches is to assert their institutional interests, such 
as religious equality and equal treatment or access to 
media licenses, and to enforce a conservative moral 
agenda. Evangelical churches support candidates 
informally or officially, striving to have their interests 
represented in parliament by the cross-party Evan-
gelical Parliamentary Front, and by their candidates 
appointed to the relevant committees in the National 
Congress. 
Generally in Brazil, under the presidency of Jair 
Messias Bolsonaro, the demarcation between politics 
and religion has become more porous. Even as a 
presidential candidate, Bolsonaro benefited like no 
other from the support of a large section of the Evan-
gelical electorate; he continues to enjoy dispropor-
tionately high levels of approval in this social group. 
From a democratic-pluralist perspective, three devel-
opments in Brazil can be seen as problematic: first, 
the dominant Evangelical churches are committed to 
opposing the social and legal recognition of non-tradi-
tional ways of life. Second, the leading figures of the 
most influential mega-churches are becoming major 
economic players, who are also directly or indirectly 
politically active – a concentration of power across 
three social subsystems. Third, the ideological wing 
of Bolsonaro’s cabinet is driven by the belief that it 
is engaged in a cultural struggle with forces that 
threaten Christianity. 
A context-sensitive (development) policy focusing 
on Brazil and Latin America should take greater 
account of the relevance of Evangelicals in society 
and politics and include selected Evangelical actors as 
interlocutors, especially at the local level. The fact 
that societies in Germany and the European Union 
are strongly influenced by Christianity puts Euro-
peans in a strong position to counteract in bilateral 
and bi-regional relations ideologies claiming that reli-
gions are competing and that Christianity is losing. 
Such ideas jeopardise social peace in Latin America. 
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Politics and religion have a complex and reciprocal 
relationship, even in secular states. By shaping the 
faith and lifestyle of their parishioners, who are also 
citizens of a state, religions influence society and 
politics. Every religion contains not only references to 
the supernatural or transcendental,1 but also a certain 
world view. Religious faith offers world orientation 
and regulates the dialectical relationship between 
retreating from the world and involvement in the 
world. Such retreating from the world results from 
an occupation with transcendental questions (one’s 
relation to God and the hereafter); an involvement in 
the world is already inherent in the fact that religions 
and their believers are present, and work, in the 
world.2 Moreover, religions claim to help shape the 
secular in a normative way, be it in the private indi-
vidual sphere or in the public collective sphere. 
In this tense relationship between retreat from and 
involvement in the world, religions demand different 
degrees of world renunciation or engagement from 
their adherents,3 which in turn can evolve over time, 
as will be demonstrated here for Evangelicals. This 
requirement (world renunciation vs. world engage-
 
1 While Max Weber places the “relationship of men to 
supernatural forces” at the centre of his definition of reli-
gion, Peter Berger emphasises the transcendental dimension, 
Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, edited by Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: Uni-
versity California Press, 1978), 424; Peter Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1967). 
2 Max Weber believed that “[t]he most elementary forms 
of behaviour motivated by religious or magical factors are 
oriented to this world”, Weber, Economy and Society (see note 
1), 399. 
3 Bernd Oberdorfer, “Religiöser Einfluss in Staat und 
Gesellschaft. Eine Problemskizze”, in Machtfaktor Religion. 
Formen religiöser Einflussnahme auf Politik und Gesellschaft, ed. 
Bernd Oberdorfer and Peter Waldmann (Cologne et al.: 
Böhlau, 2012), 1–13 (7f.). 
ment) is based on a certain ideal conception of society 
or the social system, and a specific attitude towards 
politics, at least implicitly. Furthermore, religions 
continually react to political events and develop-
ments, for example via theological divisions, doctrinal 
renewals and institutional adjustments. 
Like politics, religion must be 
examined at the empirical level of 
practice to identify patterns of 
interaction. 
Politics does not take place in a vacuum of values, 
but in a normative environment that is, inter alia, 
subject to the influence of religious convictions. Polit-
ical decisions can be inspired more or less covertly 
by beliefs, or visibly collide with them. Furthermore, 
it is up to politics to regulate the status and scope of 
action of religious organisations via legislation. Of 
course, faith communities are not indifferent to this 
political task. In secular states with pluralistic socie-
ties, churches are recognised actors not only in the 
“market of spiritual goods” but also in the “market of 
values, ideas and interests”. A strict institutional sep-
aration between state and (dominant) religion exists 
virtually nowhere.4 The balance of power among the 
different faith communities in a country can differ in 
terms of material or immaterial resources (status, 
members, finances, and assertiveness). Each religion 
also defines its relationship to other faiths. Their rela-
tionship pattern can be, structurally as well as situa-
tionally, competitive or cooperative (e.g. ecumenism 
in Christianity). Moreover, religious communities and 
their organisations often take on social tasks. These 
have a political effect where church institutions are 
more noticeably present for citizens than state insti-
 
4 On this point, see Jonathan Fox, “Do Democracies Have 
Separation of Religion and State?” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 40, no. 1 (March 2007), 1–25. 
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tutions, for instance in remote places – which is a 
very widespread situation in Latin America. 
Like politics, religion must also be examined at the 
empirical level of practice, i.e. at the level of institu-
tional functioning and the actions of specific actors to 
identify patterns of interaction. For example, even in 
the case of the distinctly hierarchical Catholic Church 
in two similarly developed South American countries 
such as Argentina and Chile, there are clear differ-
ences in the way the respective clergy dealt with the 
military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s: sup-
portively and cooperatively east of the Andes (Argen-
tina), critically and in a spirit of some resistance west 
of the Andes (Chile).5 Such divergences show that 
“religion” is too broad, too heterogeneous a category 
to serve as a heuristic diagnostic instrument and lead 
to meaningful insights. The Catholic Church, for ex-
ample, is home to such divergent currents as Opus 
Dei and liberation theology.6 
One should be cautious about generalising the 
relationship between Evangelicals and politics in 
Latin America, since the national context is of great 
significance. Factors such as a specific sacred tradi-
tion, political culture or historical imprint influence 
the actors and institutions in the religious and public 
spheres of a country in different ways. Moreover, in 
each state, the two social subsystems of religion and 
politics are differently structured in legal, institution-
al and social terms. The Evangelical world consists of 
a diverse, highly fragmented landscape of churches 
that stand in stark contrast to the centralism of the 
Catholic Church, with its pontificate at the head and 
the Vatican as its headquarters. In order to examine 
the political activity of the Evangelicals, we must 
 
5 Peter Waldmann, “Verbündeter oder Gegner der Herr-
schenden: Die Rolle der lateinamerikanischen Kirche unter 
der Militärdiktatur”, in Machtfaktor Religion, ed. Oberdorfer 
and Waldmann (see note 3), 233–52. The author identifies 
two main factors that explain the different patterns of 
action. In contrast to Argentina, the existence in Chile of a 
significant Protestant, especially Pentecostal, community (i.e. 
a pronounced religious pluralism) and a more deeply rooted 
democratic tradition (i.e. a political culture) would have pre-
pared the ground for the Catholic Church to adopt a more 
critical and distanced attitude towards the dictatorship of 
Augusto Pinochet – although the military dictatorship in 
Argentina was also much more repressive. 
6 Nikolaus Werz, “Theologie der Befreiung in Lateinameri-
ka”, in Die Ambivalenz des Religiösen. Religionen als Friedensstifter 
und Gewalterzeuger, ed. Bernd Oberdorfer and Peter Wald-
mann (Freiburg et al.: Rombach, 2008), 107–31. 
therefore focus on a specific setting: in this paper, it 
will be Brazil. An analysis of the development of 
Evangelical churches in Latin America precedes and 
contextualises the case study. 
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Evangelicalism is spreading rapidly in Latin America. 
Two additional developments accompany it. On the 
individual, subjective level, religiosity intensifies 
since, compared to Catholics, faith plays a much more 
significant role in the life of Evangelicals. On the level 
of society, the dominance of the Catholic Church 
decreases for two reasons: it loses members in favour 
of the Evangelical Churches; and the latter challenge 
its social and political influence. It is a relationship 
that can be starkly observed in Brazil, yet it also tends 
to apply to the entire region, with a few exceptions. 
Evangelicalism 
The term “Evangelical” (Spanish: evangélica/o)7 is 
ambiguous and controversial. It refers to a hetero-
geneous group of largely independent Christian 
churches from the Protestant tradition attached to 
various national and regional associations. Nomen-
clatures and classifications within this religious uni-
verse are not strictly consistent. There are discrepan-
cies in names between languages, adherents, religious 
 
7 In Spanish-speaking Latin America the term evangélica/o 
has come to mean the religious communities discussed here. 
Evangélicas, however, not only includes the Pentecostal (pente-
costales) and neo-Pentecostal (neopentecostales) communities, 
but also a number of other non-Catholic Christian denomi-
nations (on this term, see Fn. 25). It does not include the 
historically Protestant congregations of the Lutheran or 
Calvinist traditions, for these are usually referred to as 
Protestant congregations. Evangelical, on the other hand, is 
used more frequently to refer to the first missionaries who 
came from the USA. The term Evangelista, sometimes errone-
ously used in Latin America for members of Evangelical 
churches, should be reserved for Jesus’ four disciples, after 
whom the four gospels are named. 
authorities and researchers.8 “Evangelical” is used 
here as an umbrella concept, which primarily in-
cludes Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches.9 
Members of the historically Protestant churches such 
as Lutherans and Calvinists, i.e. the so-called immi-
gration churches or transplant churches in Latin 
America, do not fall under this category. Rather 
“Evangelical” refers to a wide range of more recent 
and now Latin American churches, which exhibit 
many of the characteristics below.10 
Evangelical churches assume a literal interpreta-
tion of the Bible. It contains, they believe, the healthy 
doctrine (sana doctrina) that glorifies Christ and heals 
sin. Huge importance is therefore attached to inten-
sive study of the Bible. Evangelicals believe that God 
intervenes in daily life, for example by giving good 
health and material wealth to Christians with strong 
faith (Prosperity Gospel). The work of the Holy Spirit 
has a central importance in the teaching and faith 
practice of Evangelicals. Worship services often in-
 
8 Heinrich Schäfer, “The Pentecostal Movement: Social 
Transformation and Religious Habitus”, in What the World 
Believes: Analysis and Commentary on the Religion Monitor 2008, 
ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung (Gütersloh, 2009), 533–85 (536f.). 
9 The word Pentecost comes from the ancient Greek (Πεντη-
κοστή, Pentēkostē, in English: fiftieth day). In the New Testa-
ment it refers to a Jewish holiday on the 50
th
 day after Easter 
Sunday. This became relevant for Christianity since on this 
day the Holy Spirit is said to have descended on the disciples 
of Jesus. 
10 Paul Freston identifies four constant characteristics of 
Evangelical faith: “conversionism (emphasis on the need for 
change of life), activism (emphasis on evangelistic and mis-
sionary efforts), biblicism (a special importance attributed to 
the Bible, though not necessarily the fundamentalist shibbo-
leth of ‘inerrancy’), and crucicentrism (emphasis on the 
centrality of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross)”, Paul Freston, 
“Introduction”, in: idem, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 1–7 (2). 
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clude manifestations that are considered “gifts from 
the Holy Spirit,” such as healing by laying on hands, 
speaking in tongues (glossolalia), exorcism, and re-
ceiving direct revelations from God. With regard to 
eschatology, i.e. the doctrine of the ultimate destiny 
of the individual human being and the world, Evan-
gelicals are followers of millenarianism. They believe 
that the return of Jesus Christ (parousia) is imminent, 
and that he will establish a kingdom for a thousand 
years (a millennium) with Israel as the politically and 
religiously dominating world power, followed by the 
Last Judgment. While Pentecostal churches more 
strongly profess pre-millennialism (the belief that 
the present is pre-millennial), the neo-Pentecostal 
churches adhere to a post-Millennialism (the belief 
that the millennium has already begun). 
Evangelicals usually oppose non-
traditional lifestyles even more 
rigorously than Catholics. 
While the Catholic Church in Latin America (with the 
Vatican’s support) takes a similarly conservative atti-
tude to moral and social issues, most Evangelicals are 
even more rigorously opposed to abortion, homo-
sexuality, same-sex marriage, artificial means of birth 
control, sex outside marriage, and alcohol consump-
tion. This difference remains even between Catholics 
and Evangelicals of similar piety levels. 
In a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre 
in 2014, former Catholics most frequently gave the 
following reasons for their conversion to Evangeli-
calism:11 the search for a personal connection to God 
(81%); the joy of worship in a new church (69%); the 
need to attach more importance to morality (60%); 
the desire to belong to a church that helps its mem-
bers more (59%); and the personal approach of the 
new church (58%). Immaterial concerns thus clearly 
prevail over material interests. Qualitative studies 
show that Evangelical churches convey a sense of 
belonging and foster an emotional bond that neither 
the Catholic Church nor the state can offer today. 
People from precarious and vulnerable social condi-
tions marked by alcoholism and domestic violence 
seem to succeed better in escaping the misery and 
 
11 Pew Research Center, Religion in Latin America. Widespread 
Change in a Historically Catholic Region (Washington, D.C., 13 
November 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/7/2014/11/Religion-in-Latin-America-11-12-PM-
full-PDF.pdf (accessed 20 December 2018). 
reintegrating the world of work after having joined 
an Evangelical church.12 Faith communities thus lead 
them back to an orderly life. The view held by Pente-
costal churches that material well-being is proof of 
God’s favour (Prosperity Gospel) here works as a self-
fulfilling prophecy. It also refers to the community as 
a whole. In Evangelical circles, the principle that 
believers cede a tenth (tithe) or other portion of their 
personal income to the church plays a central role. 
This pecuniary charge is levied by church authorities 
based on the Old Testament, and paid with great dis-
cipline by the majority of the faithful, providing 
Evangelical churches and elites with significant re-
sources. 
Another characteristic of Evangelicals, especially 
the Neo-Pentecostals, is a strong sense of mission. 
Missionary work has gone through three different 
phases in the history of the (wider) Protestant move-
ment in the region:13 (1) Evangelisation in the service 
of human development, aiming to individually and 
socially promote and recognise the most marginalised 
groups in society; (2) Evangelisation in the exclusively 
religious sense; (3) Evangelisation with the predomi-
nant intention of proselytising and promoting one-
self, based on an understanding of the church that 
resembles corporate management. One speaks of the 
“second Evangelisation of Latin America” considering 
the numerical expansion of Evangelical congregations 
in the region and the centrality they attach to mission. 
The Decreasing Dominance of the 
Catholic Church  
Latin America is regarded as the Catholic region of the 
world. Its two most important colonial powers, Spain 
and Portugal, left the subcontinent with a socially, 
 
12 See Schäfer, “The Pentecostal Movement” (see note 8), 
546. 
13 This division into three phases, in which missionary 
work or evangelisation has variously played a role, draws on 
José Luis Pérez Guadalupe, “¿Políticos Evangélicos o Evan-
gélicos Políticos? Los Nuevos Modelos de Conquista Política 
de los Evangélicos en América Latina” [Evangelical politi-
cians or political Evangelicals? The new models of political 
conquest of the Evangelicals in Latin America], in Evangélicos 
y Poder en América Latina [Evangelicals and power in Latin 
America], ed. José Luis Pérez Guadalupe and Sebastian 
Grundberger (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Social Cristianos 
[IESC] and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung [KAS], 2018), 11–106 
(17). 
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economically and politically dominant religion. The 
variety of religious beliefs that shaped Latin America 
by its numerous indigenous peoples and the influ-
ence of African slaves has always been reflected in 
religious syncretism (e.g. Macumba in Brazil); immi-
grants of other denominations also contributed to a 
certain religious diversity. For a long time, however, 
this remained limited to migrant settlements and was 
relatively “invisible”, especially in wider society. 
In the vast majority of Latin American countries, 
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church still has a 
special status with a number of legal and financial 
advantages, such as a special mention in the Consti-
tution, recognition as a public corporation (and not 
merely a civil corporation), tax benefits or financial 
contributions from the state. Among the prerogatives 
of the Catholic Church is a privileged access to poli-
tics, whether through formalised or tolerated influ-
ence on legislation, the official participation of the 
Church in political processes; or close links between 
the spiritual and political elite. The Catholic Church 
also has great mobilisation capital: it can host mega-
events and bring people out onto the streets. Exten-
sive intellectual resources and a pronounced attitude 
of involvement in the world allow it to articulate 
doctrinal positions – that is, teachings of the Church 
– in secular terms and in the form of ostensible 
sociological arguments, so that they can be presented 
as universalist and accessible. Finally, the Catholic 
Church has schools, universities, hospitals, social 
organisations, and political parties (such as Christian 
Democratic parties) that are more or less close to it, 
and members in all organs of state.14 
The Catholic Church in Latin America 
has already experienced two caesuras, 
which were accompanied by a marked 
loss of power. 
Such connections between church, state and 
society can seem natural and be taken for granted as 
long as the dominant religion is not challenged by 
secular social or political forces and/or other, worse-
off or oppressed religious communities. In the long 
 
14 On this point I follow the arguments concerning Argen-
tina proposed by Hilario Wynarczyk, “Argentina: ¿Vino 
Nuevo en Odres Viejos? Evangélicos y Política” [Argentina: 
new wine in old hoses? Evangelicals and politics], in Evan-
gélicos y Poder en América Latina, ed. Pérez Guadalupe and 
Grundberger (see note 13), 107–40 (134ff.). 
epoch of its supremacy in the region, the Catholic 
Church has experienced at least two caesuras, accom-
panied by a marked loss of power. 
The first upheaval was driven by secular forces. In 
the second half of the 19th century, the Catholic 
Church in Latin America had to accept a significant 
curtailment of its prerogatives. With the emergence 
of the bourgeoisie and associated liberal political 
forces, demands were voiced in the subcontinent’s 
states for a sharper separation of church and state 
and for a secularisation of the state, which resulted in 
a series of laicist reforms. For example, religious edu-
cation was banned from state schools, civil marriage 
and birth registration were introduced, and much of 
the land and real estate of the Catholic Church was 
transferred to state ownership. By these measures the 
Church lost not only material resources, but signifi-
cant political influence; nevertheless it maintained its 
supremacy over other faith communities.15 
The second challenge to the Catholic Church’s 
dominance in Latin America is more social than 
political in nature, and manifests itself as “religious 
competitive pressure”.16 Since the 1950s, and even 
more so since the 1970s, it has been steadily losing 
members – though not due to an expansion of secu-
larism.17 Rather, religious pluralism is growing, no 
longer because immigrants contribute to it, but un-
doubtedly from within Latin American societies. 
Evangelical churches in particular have gained fol-
lowers over the years (and are subsumed hereinafter 
under the broader category “Protestant” due to the 
terminology used in the main data source). Only four 
countries in the region show deviating trends,18 on 
 
15 Peter Waldmann, “Verbündeter oder Gegner der Herr-
schenden: Die Rolle der lateinamerikanischen Kirche unter 
der Militärdiktatur”, in Machtfaktor Religion, ed. Oberdorfer 
and Waldmann (see note 3), 233–52 (233). 
16 The following paragraphs are based on an earlier public-
cation by the author: Claudia Zilla, Evangelicals and Politics in 
Latin America. Religious Switching and Its Growing Political Rele-
vance, SWP Comment 46/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, October 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/ 
publication/evangelicals-and-politics-in-latin-america-1/ 
(accessed 20 December 2018). 
17 Secularism comprises three categories of religious self-
description: atheistic, agnostic and non-religious. 
18 Data from Corporación Latinobarómetro, El Papa Fran-
cisco y la religión en Chile y América Latina. Latinobarómetro 1995–
2017 [Pope Francis and religion in Chile and Latin America] 
(Santiago de Chile, January 2018), http://bit.ly/2NvpPYt 
(accessed 20 December 2018). 
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the one hand because Catholicism has been stable 
there, on the other due to growing secularism. In 
contrast with the rest of Latin America, the Catholic 
Church has not suffered (considerable) losses in 
Mexico and Paraguay. Respectively 80 and 89 percent 
of their population today describe themselves as 
Catholic, and only 5 percent as Protestant. Yet in Chile 
(38%) and Uruguay (41%), the number of atheists and 
agnostics has increased significantly. 
Most Latin American countries, however, are ex-
periencing religious transformation. The data point to 
a strong correlation between the declining number of 
those who describe themselves as Catholic and the 
increase in non-Catholic Christians, mainly Evangeli-
cals. According to Latinobarómetro 2018, less than half 
the population of Honduras (37%), El Salvador (38%), 
Nicaragua (40%), Guatemala (43%) and the Dominican 
Republic (48%) consider themselves Catholic. These 
countries have the highest proportions of Protestant 
believers in Latin America, most of whom are Evan-
gelicals: Honduras (39%), El Salvador (28%), Nicaragua 
(32 percent), Guatemala (41%), and the Dominican 
Republic (21%). In Brazil (54%), Panama (55%) and 
Costa Rica (57%) a majority of the population still sees 
itself as Catholic, but even there more than a quarter 
of the population self-describes as Protestant. Between 
1995 and 2017, the proportion of Catholics in ten 
countries in the region fell by between 22 and 39 per-
centage points. The decline is particularly pronounced 
in Central America. 
In the last 50 years, religious adher-
ence has shifted towards Evangelical 
churches in most Latin American 
countries. 
Thus in the last fifty years in the great majority of 
Latin American states, the numerical weight has 
shifted from the Catholic Church towards Evangelical 
churches.19 These developments are causally linked: 
surveys confirm that most Evangelicals formerly be-
longed to the historically dominant religion. They 
have changed from “passive Catholics” or “nominal 
believers”, who felt culturally connected with the 
 
19 A further development in Latin America consists of the 
so-called “Evangelicalization of the Catholic Church”. This 
refers to the influence of the charismatic renewal movement 
within the Catholic Church, which has much in common 
with Pentecostalism. The Catholic Charismatic Renewal was 
officially recognised by the Vatican in 1973. 
denomination but did not regularly participate in 
religious activities,20 to “active Evangelicals”. This is 
partly because Evangelicalism is not a matter of birth, 
but a conscious decision by adults. The turn towards 
an Evangelical faith community goes hand in hand 
with a stronger commitment to religion and one’s 
own congregation. 
In parallel with the expansion of religious plural-
ism in Latin America, religious acceptance also in-
creased. Two factors have contributed to this. The 
Second Vatican Council (October 1962–December 
1965) under Pope John XXIII, which was intended 
to bring about a pastoral and ecumenical renewal of 
the Church, also moved the Catholic Church toward 
recognising religious freedom. Moreover, with the 
expansion of (collective) rights and the strengthening 
of political and social movements of indigenous 
communities in Latin America, tolerance for diverse 
worldviews increased.21 There is a certain “cultural 
continuity” between Latin American popular reli-
giosity and Evangelicalism.22 Elements of popular 
religiosity are adopted and legitimised by the Evan-
gelical churches.23 
Evangelical Diversity 
The development of Latin America’s Protestant (in the 
broadest sense) churches can historically be divided 
into three phases, each of which is characterised by a 
different degree of retreating from the world or be-
coming involved in it, and thus also by a specific rela-
tionship to society and politics.24 
 
20 R. Andrew Chesnut, Competitive Spirits. Latin America’s New 
Religious Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
9. 
21 Juan G. Navarro Floria, “Introducción” [Introduction], in 
Estado, Derecho y Religión en América Latina [State, law and reli-
gion in Latin America], coord. Juan G. Navarro Floria (Buenos 
Aires et al.: Marcial Pons, 2008), 11–16. 
22 Alejandro Frigerio, “La experiencia religiosa pente-
costal”, Nueva Sociedad, no. 280 (March–April 2019): 47–54 
(50). 
23 Ibid. 
24 There are numerous models for systematising the his-
tory of Protestant and Evangelical churches in Latin America. 
While there is broad consensus on the major lines of devel-
opment, the models differ in terms of phase classification, 
grouping and differentiation. The present study is based 
most closely on the systematisations of José Luis Pérez 
Guadalupe and Hilario Wynarczyk in Evangélicos y Poder en 
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The first missionaries of the traditional Protestant 
denominations25 reached Latin America in the mid-
19th century. They saw mission and educational op-
portunities as ways of influencing society. The idea-
tional foundation for their social commitment was 
social ethics directed towards the common good. 
Church members were involved in evangelisation, 
education and social work. Numerous pastors and 
parishioners within these churches sympathised with 
liberation theology, the ecumenical movement and a 
contextualised interpretation of biblical statements 
that distances itself from a purely literal reception of 
Scripture. Politically mostly liberal, the early Protes-
tants together with anti-clerical forces stood up for 
religious freedom, the separation of state and church, 
secular education and civil marriage. Even though 
this kind of alliance was successful, the political role 
of these first Protestants remained limited, as did 
their social role, since their evangelisation efforts 
hardly bore any fruit. Their impact remained limited 
to European immigration communities. Today the 
churches of this phase are a minority within the 
Protestant universe in Latin America. However, they 
have considerable intellectual capital and good con-
nections to the middle and upper social strata. 
In the early 20th century a new Protestant move-
ment mainly consisting of missionaries from the USA 
reached the region. Comparative analyses describe it 
as conservative-biblical, anti-communist and anti-
ecumenical.26 The main focus of the mission work of 
this “Evangelical Protestantism” or “Evangelicalism” 
(Spanish: Evangelicales) was conversion, so as to help 
bring Jesus Christ into people’s lives and steadily 
grow the faith community. This Evangelicalism was 
based on a literal understanding of the Bible, which 
in the opinion of its representatives contained a plan 
of salvation, and called for a retreat from the corrupt 
world and thus also from politics; at most, individual 
participation was tolerated. Accordingly, social ethics 
here were less focused on society as a whole than on a 
believer’s immediate religious community. Evangeli-
cal Protestantism spread with great success among the 
 
América Latina, ed. Pérez Guadalupe and Grundberger (see 
note 13), 11–106 and 107–41. 
25 “Denomination” denotes a separate religious commu-
nity within a religion. For the faith community, its shared 
name (denomination) stands for its collective identity. 
26 ”Anti-ecumenical” describes an attitude that opposes 
the dialogue between different Christian faith orientations. 
In the Latin American context, it generally means anti-
Catholic. 
middle, and especially the lower social strata of Latin 
America. Supporters of this religious movement27 
tend to adopt conservative values and to be apologists 
for the prevailing social and political conditions.28 It 
was this Protestant movement that finally helped the 
denomination evangélica/o (instead of protestante) to 
prevail in Latin America. In the context of this grow-
ing Evangelical presence, the role type of the national 
Evangelical pastor replaced the one of the foreign 
Protestant missionary. 
Today’s Evangelicals, whose denominations form 
the largest group within Latin American Protestan-
tism, can trace back to a movement which originated 
in the early 20th century in the USA and was brought 
into the region by charismatic leaders. Yet these 
churches are now clearly rooted in Latin American 
culture, and the denomination – though conserva-
tively biblically oriented – can today no longer be 
called Evangelical (evangelical), but evangélica. The 
Evangelicals now predominant in Latin America have 
abandoned many previous stances (anti-communism, 
anti-ecumenism etc.). First and foremost they want to 
convert and bring about a renewal of Latin American 
religiosity. They have gained new supporters especial-
ly among the urban and rural lower social strata. 
There may be several thousand 
different Evangelical churches in the 
same country. 
Pentecostal social ethics were originally individual-
istic and focused on mission work. Their pre-Millen-
nialism encouraged the acceptance of worldly injus-
tice and personal suffering, since the imminent re-
turn of Christ would put an end to it. This resulted in 
a retreat from the world, a rejection of social and 
political commitment. However, this attitude changed 
from the 1980s onwards and gave way to an increas-
ing involvement in the world, which is more typical 
for the post-Millennialism of the neo-Pentecostal 
church movement. The latter likewise assigns the 
highest prestige to mission for the purpose of conver-
sion. The social ethics of the neo-Pentecostals, how-
ever, present themselves as political ethics, while 
 
27 The term “movement” here generally refers to a cross-
denominational type of religious community that has a 
number of relevant common characteristics and shapes a 
particular historical phase. 
28 Later tendencies of Evangelical Protestantism have 
attached more importance to the “social question”. 
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charity work is considered of marginal importance. 
Believers are invited to get involved in society and 
politics. The neo-Pentecostal church movement finds 
special resonance in the middle and higher social 
strata of Latin America. Due to the success of the 
Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches, these third-
phase Evangelicals have become important minorities 
in many of the region’s countries. In Central America, 
they have already exceeded the 40 percent mark. 
From a perspective of the sociology of religion the 
Pentecostal movement has been described as a hetero-
geneous, fluid and highly dynamic social movement.29 
Several thousand different and independent Evangeli-
cal churches may exist within the same country, and 
may join together to form a variety of umbrella orga-
nisations – if at all. Even religious communities in 
remote places belonging to a particular Evangelical 
church (usually located in a big city) normally retain a 
high degree of autonomy. The relationship between 
the central and peripheral congregations is often 
based on a sort of franchising, whereby the rural 
branches are given the right to use the denomination. 
Numerous Evangelical churches have emerged as 
a consequence of secessions that regroup around 
charismatic leaders. There is a general tendency to 
favour pastoral charisma over theological competence 
(there is hardly any formal training).30 Occasionally 
churches have developed a few selection criteria and 
preparatory stages for qualification as pastors, but 
these are not systematically applied. Overall it is 
relatively easy for believers with leadership skills to 
legitimise themselves as pastors after a short “sociali-
sation period” and subsequently establish their own 
congregation or even a new church. Progressing to 
such a position is also experienced and understood 
as a form of social advancement. Most pastors come 
from humble backgrounds. The pronounced tendency 
towards secession is also connected with the self-
image of Evangelicals. They see themselves as a move-
ment of revival and renewal of traditions. Therefore, 
after a certain period of institutionalisation, they 
often dare to break with existing churches, which 
further advances the process of fragmentation.31 This 
is why Evangelical churches with presences in many 
Latin American states tend to be the exception. How-
ever, even where Evangelical faith communities 
 
29 Schäfer, “The Pentecostal Movement” (see note 8), 534. 
30 Chesnut, Competitive Spirits (see note 20), 157. 
31 Pérez Guadalupe, “¿Políticos Evangélicos o Evangélicos 
Políticos?“ (see note 13). 
count themselves as part of a larger international 
movement of foreign origin, the Latin American pro-
file (and even more so the national profile) predomi-
nates in terms of personnel, structure and operation. 
The work of the Evangelical churches 
is now shaping the lives of many 
people, be it in the city or in the 
countryside. 
This Latin American or national profile manifests 
itself in many different ways. Public attention has 
been particularly drawn to Evangelical churches that, 
like corporations, offer services to various social 
milieus. More numerous, however, are the Evangeli-
cal churches whose activities focus on marginalised 
and disadvantaged social groups in poorer congrega-
tions. The work of Evangelical churches is now shap-
ing the lives of many people, be it in the city or in 
the countryside. In urban centres, many mostly neo-
Pentecostal Evangelical communities under the 
leadership of charismatic preachers have changed 
from “garage temples” to “mega-churches”, and 
settled in former theatres and new monumental 
buildings. In Santiago de Chile the first Evangelical 
University of the country is to be built opposite the 
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile.32 In smaller 
towns and villages, simple shops (for example) are 
transformed into Evangelical temples in the evening 
or on weekends. Evangelical churches also have a 
strong presence in the slums (villas, favelas), where 
criminal gangs often hold sway. They tend to be the 
only providers of pastoral care and social and health 
assistance in the “underworlds” of Latin America, the 
prisons. Wherever human rights are massively vio-
lated and the state is either absent or only repressive, 
Evangelical pastors support the affected persons im-
materially and materially. 
 
32 This is an initiative of the Municipality of Bendecidos para 
Bendecir, Nicolás Massai and Francisco Velásquez, “Frente a 
frente: primera universidad evangélica se levanta mirando a 
la PUC” [Face to face: the first Evangelical University is built 
in front of the PUC], diarioUchile, 1 January 2018, 
https://radio.uchile.cl/2018/01/01/frente-a-frente-primera-
universidad-evangelica-se-levanta-mirando-a-la-puc/ (accessed 
20 December 2018). 
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The Evangelicals’ Growing Political 
Engagement 
Religious pluralism now forms part of the social reali-
ty of Latin America; the Evangelical churches have an 
important role to play. Yet measured by their demo-
graphic weight, Evangelicals are (still) politically 
underrepresented in all Latin American countries. The 
beginnings of political participation by Evangelicals 
in Latin America go back to the 1980s, when many 
countries transitioned from a military dictatorship to 
a democratic regime. The Pentecostal and neo-Pente-
costal Evangelicals only began to influence politics 
later, in the 1990s. The change in the Latin American 
Evangelicals’ perspective on the world – from an 
initial retreat to a subsequent involvement that was 
once characteristic of traditional Protestantism – was 
due to several factors.33 
Evangelicals in Latin America now have their own 
specific history spanning several generations, and 
great demographic weight. This has boosted their self-
confidence and strengthened their claim to shape 
politics. The established parties, on the other hand, 
have been highly discredited over poor governance 
and corruption scandals. This so-called crisis of repre-
sentation has prepared the way for new actors, who 
draw their social cachet from professions outside 
politics, such as acting, sport, and journalism. In this 
context, some Evangelical pastors have also sought to 
make their way into politics, presenting themselves as 
successful religious leaders with a discourse of ethical 
renewal and moralising politics. In Latin America 
“the church” (of any denomination) is rather highly 
trusted by the population (63%), while the political 
parties (of any colour) are the least trusted (13%).34 
The turn towards politics, which more and more 
Evangelicals have pursued, also has a theological 
dimension, namely the turning away from pre-Millen-
nialism and the shift to post-Millennialism, a process 
which many faith communities went through in the 
late 1980s. The post-Millennial doctrine goes hand in 
hand with a more optimistic view of the world, and a 
stronger reference to the present. Its followers believe 
 
33 For a detailed analysis of these facilitating factors, see 
Pérez Guadalupe, “¿Políticos Evangélicos o Evangélicos 
Políticos? “ (see note 13), 34ff. 
34 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2018 [Report 
2018] (Santiago de Chile, November 2018), http://www. 
latinobarometro.org/latNewsShowMore.jsp?evYEAR= 
2018vMONTH=-1 (accessed 20 December 2018). 
that they can actively participate in the establishment 
of the Kingdom of God on Earth, including through 
political engagement. 
The civic engagement of Evangelicals 
in Latin America has strongly 
increased. 
Evangelical parties have been founded in many 
Latin American countries since the third wave of 
democratisation in the 1980s. However, most of them 
could not achieve political relevance. In that phase 
Evangelical churches also tried to achieve equal treat-
ment with the Catholic Church in the sense of an 
expansion of religious freedom, the secularisation of 
the state, and the realisation of the democratic prin-
ciple of equality. In many of the region’s countries, 
Evangelicals have relied on public engagement and 
lobbying to advance relevant legislation and constitu-
tional reforms. 
Yet in the same epoch the first Evangelicals did 
take the levers of power. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Guatemala had the first two Evangelical heads of state 
in Latin America: the dictator General Efraín Ríos 
Montt and the democratically elected Jorge Serrano 
Elías. Decades later, in January 2016, the Evangelical 
comedian Jimmy Morales took office as President of 
Guatemala. In Costa Rica, the Evangelical Fabricio 
Alvarado, a singer of Christian music and a member 
of the Protestant National Restoration Party (Restau-
ración Nacional, RN), made it to the runoff for the 
presidency in 2018, which he lost to Carlos Alvarado. 
More successful were Jair Messias Bolsonaro in Brazil 
(of whom more below) and the Catholic and left-wing 
candidate of the National Regeneration Movement 
(Movimiento Regeneración Nacional, MORENA), 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who received Evan-
gelical support in the 2018 Mexican presidential 
elections: the Evangelical-Conservative Party of Social 
Encounter (Partido Encuentro Social, PES) supported 
his successful presidential candidacy.35 
The civic engagement of Evangelicals in Latin 
America has also increased considerably. Many of 
them regularly take part in protest rallies and go on 
the offensive against diversity politics, positive dis-
crimination for minorities, and the extension of equal 
rights for women and for groups who follow non-
 
35 Cecilia A. Delgado-Molina, “La ‘irrupción evangélica’ en 
México” [The ‘Evangelical irruption’ in Mexico], Nueva Socie-
dad, no. 280 (March–April 2019): 91–100. 
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traditional lifestyles. In Colombia, for example, Evan-
gelicals mobilised against the peace agreement in the 
2016 referendum because it was allegedly supported 
by a “gender ideology”; the same year in Mexico, they 
agitated against same-sex marriage;36 in Argentina in 
2018 against the decriminalisation of abortion; and 
similarly in Uruguay against the so-called integral law 
for the legal recognition of transsexuals –just to 
name a few current examples. In their struggle “for 
life and family”, the Evangelicals strongly concur 
with some Catholic groups and right-wing political 
forces, an ideological convergence that has been 
called “conservative new ecumenism”.37 
 
36 Alberto Nájar, “La marcha ‘sin precedentes’ en México 
contra la legalización del matrimonio gay” [The ‘unprece-
dented’ march in Mexico against the legalisation of gay 
marriage], BBC Mundo (Mexico City), 11 September 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-
37331685 (accessed 20 December 2018). 
37 Wynarczyk, “¿Vino Nuevo en Odres Viejos?” (see note 
14), 135. 
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In Brazil, the interplay between Evangelicals and 
politics has a dynamism that is unparalleled in the 
region.38 The political relevance of the Evangelicals 
in this South American country is based on a social 
significance that goes beyond the demographic weight 
of the faith community. Brazil’s “Evangelical world” 
is highly differentiated and now comprises various 
social strata. However, it is primarily three Evangeli-
cal churches and two parties associated with them 
that dominate the political stage. They played a major 
role in Jair Messias Bolsonaro being elected president 
in October 2018. 
Social Relevance 
In absolute numbers, Brazil is the country with the 
second largest Christian population in the world 
(after the USA). It is also the largest Catholic country 
and is now – according to several estimates – home 
to the Evangelical congregations with the most mem-
bers in the world. The 2010 Brazilian census iden-
tified over 42 million people of Evangelical faith, 
representing 22.2 percent of the total population.39 
Of these, 13.3 percent are members of Pentecostal 
churches, 4 percent of historical Protestant churches, 
and 4.8 percent Protestants without church affilia-
tion. According to a representative national survey 
conducted in October 2017, seven years after the cen-
sus, as many as 32 percent of Brazilians now describe 
 
38 R. Andrew Chesnut, Born Again in Brazil. The Pentecostal 
Boom and the Pathogens of Poverty (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1997). 
39 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), 
Censo Demográfico 2010. Características da população e dos domi-
cílios [Demographic census 2010. Characteristics of the 
population and households] (Rio de Janeiro, 2011), 
https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/93/ 
cd_2010_caracteristicas_populacao_domicilios.pdf  
(accessed 20 December 2018). 
themselves as Evangelical.40 Women and younger 
people, i.e. the group with the greatest demographic 
growth, are disproportionately represented among 
Evangelicals.41 
The Evangelical universe is as diverse as Brazilian 
society, and there is great social inequality in this 
religious subsystem as well. There are Evangelical 
churches for the rich and Evangelical churches for 
the poor, but there are also large churches that are 
more socially inclusive. According to the number and 
social background of their members, the Evangelical 
churches and their leaders have different material 
resources. In general, however, Brazilian Evangelicals 
are more likely to support their congregations finan-
cially than Catholics do.42 The tithe is a deeply inter-
nalised norm on which church leaders rely. Unlike 
the Catholic Church, which receives financial benefits 
or subsidies from the state, the Evangelical churches 
are also much more dependent on these revenues.43 
Many believers regard paying the tithe as the func-
tional equivalent of contributing to social insurance 
(which does not exist for them in this form in Brazil): 
in an emergency or in the event of unemployment, 
 
40 “Na hora do voto, 19% do brasileiros com religião 
seguem líder da igreja” [When it comes to voting, 19% of 
Brazilians who profess a religion follow their church 
leaders], Instituto Datafolha, 26 October 2017, 
http://bit.ly/33VNpn6 (accessed 20 December 2018). 
41 José Eustáquio Diniz Alves, IBGE, cited in: Paula Corrêa, 
“Honrar a Dios... con tarjeta de crédito o efectivo. El auge 
evangélico en Brasil” [Honouring God... by credit card or 
cash. The Evangelical boom in Brazil], Nueva Sociedad, no. 248 
(November–December 2013): 134–43 (139), 
http://nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/3997_1.pdf 
(accessed 20 December 2018). 
42 In a 2013 Datafolha survey, 34 percent of Catholics and 
52 percent of Evangelicals stated that they regularly support 
their own church financially, Corrêa, “Honrar a Dios ...”. (see 
note 41), 139. 
43 Chesnut, Competitive Spirits (see note 20), 11. 
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believers can hope to be supported by other members 
of the community.44 In accordance with the theology 
of prosperity to which the Neo-Pentecostals in partic-
ular adhere – i.e. the belief in a right to spiritual as 
well as material blessing – the tithe is seen as an 
investment that pays off. 
Some Evangelical churches have 
developed into spiritual niche 
products that appeal to specific social 
groups.  
Although Evangelical morality is more in line with 
traditional understanding of roles and conservative 
values, more liberal community concepts have also 
emerged in Brazil. City of refuge (Cidade de Refúgio), 
for example, is the name of the Evangelical congrega-
tion founded by a lesbian pastor couple in São Paulo 
in 2011.45 A homosexual couple of (male) Evangelical 
pastors established the Contemporary Christian 
Church (Igreja Cristã Contemporânea, ICC) in 2013, 
“so that homosexual believers can find their place 
too”.46 Such Evangelical churches dedicating them-
selves to an inclusive theology and serving the LGBTQ 
community are also increasing and growing, most 
notably in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. 
Other churches have developed into niche products 
that appeal to a specific spiritual market segment. In 
1999, for example, Rinaldo Luis de Seixas Pereira, 
called Apostle Rina, founded the Bola de Neve Church 
(Snowball Church). With his informal and strongly 
sports-focused church concept, the passionate surfer 
and pastor with a degree in marketing addresses a 
young audience that wants to follow Jesus beyond 
dogmas. At the services of this neo-Pentecostal church, 
which is now represented in all regions of Brazil and 
 
44 Lamia Oualalou, “El poder evangélico en Brasil” [Evan-
gelical power in Brazil], Nueva Sociedad, no. 260 (November–
December 2015): 122–33 (126), http://nuso.org/media/ 
articles/downloads/7.TC_Oualalou_260.pdf (accessed 
20 December 2018). 
45 Cidade de Refúgio, http://cidadederefugio.com.br (accessed 
20 December 2018). 
46 “Pastores homosexuales crean la ‘Iglesia Cristiana 
Contemporánea’” [Homosexual pastors establish the ‘Con-
temporary Christian Church’], Valores Religiosos (online), 2014, 
https://www.valoresreligiosos.com.ar/Noticias/pastores-
homosexuales-crean-la-iglesia-cristiana-contemporanea-6989 
(accessed 20 December 2018). 
in many countries on all continents, a surfboard 
serves as an altar.47 
Evangelical congregations active in Brazilian favelas 
(slums) and prisons reach a completely different tar-
get group.48 Both are places where human rights are 
massively violated – even by the state apparatus it-
self – and where marginalised, severely disadvan-
taged population groups are exposed to the control of 
criminal gangs and the arbitrariness of the (barely 
present) state. In terms of milieu, prisons are an ex-
tension of the isolated neighbourhoods where the 
prisoners used to live. Besides drug gangs, Evangelical 
churches are usually the only actors who have (per-
mitted) access to favelas and prisons. They offer people 
an alternative to criminal activity. Where there are 
no cultural or sports facilities, they provide experi-
ence-oriented services of worship with much music 
and appealing entertainment; they also promote a 
sense of personal recognition and peaceful belonging. 
Dozens of Evangelical churches register weekly in 
the country’s various prisons to hold church services, 
and offer pastoral care and social work to the detain-
ees in prison yards. Evangelical volunteers provide in-
mates with sanitary products and medical treatment. 
Pastors also communicate between the prisoners and 
their relatives, who often simply considered them 
missing. Sometimes they provide financial support to 
families when the imprisonment of a relative has cut 
off the household’s (illegal) source of money. Evan-
gelical pastors are held in high esteem in prisons. 
From time to time they are asked by the prison man-
agement to mediate in internal conflicts, and they are 
respected by gang leaders. However, this personal 
proximity is not without pitfalls. Sometimes pastors 
cannot resist a lucrative deal, and make their personal 
or church bank accounts available for money laun-
dering. They take the liberty of retaining a portion of 
the contributions that are regularly made. 
The pastoral care and social work provided by the 
Evangelical churches in the favelas and prisons follows 
an individualistic-pragmatic approach. Church repre-
sentatives help people spiritually and materially to 
survive the day-to-day. However, community work by 
 
47 Bola de Neve Church, http://boladeneve.com (accessed 
20 December 2018). 
48 The following is based on Andrew Johnson’s anthropo-
logical study, “The Politics of Presence. Evangelical Ministry 
in Brazilian Prisons”, in Religious Responses to Violence. Human 
Rights in Latin America Past and Present, ed. Alexander Wilde 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 395–
415. 
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Evangelical pastors at the local level rarely results in a 
socio-political commitment at the higher institutional 
level, or in a demand for national structural reforms. 
Three mega-churches dominate the 
Evangelical landscape of Brazil. They 
are all characterised by a pronounced 
will to shape policy. 
The colourful spectrum of Evangelical faith com-
munities in Brazil includes three mega-churches with 
a dense presence in the country and other Latin 
American countries, and with a pronounced will to 
shape policy. The Assembly of God (Assembleia de 
Deus, AD) celebrated its centenary in 2011 and is thus 
– after the Christian Congregation in Brazil (Con-
gregação Cristã no Brasil, CCB) – Brazil’s second 
oldest, and at the same time the largest Pentecostal 
Church with, according to its own figures, around 
22.5 million members. The origins of the AD move-
ment lie in the USA; the Brazilian branch was founded 
by Swedish missionaries Daniel Berg and Gunnar 
Vingren in Belém, in Pará State. Since the 1980s, the 
AD movement has experienced several secessions. 
Many individual churches and church groups have 
also become independent without giving up their 
names. The General Convention of Assemblies of God 
in Brazil (Convenção General das Assembleias de Deus 
no Brasil, CGADB) is part of the historical umbrella 
organisation headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, but its 
integrative and leadership functions are weak. CGADB 
owns a publishing house (Casa Publicadora das 
Assembleias de Deus, CPAD), a radio station49 and 
universities.50 Within the spectrum of Evangelical 
major churches, the AD churches are comparatively 
decentralised. In this respect, they follow the Presby-
terian model of representative assemblies, in which 
lay people participate and are under the charismatic 
leadership of pastor-presidents.51 The AD is divided 
into numerous Ministérios, each of which consists of 
several parishes and is headed by a mother church 
with a pastor-president (also called bishop or apostle). 
The National Convention of the Assemblies of God in 
Brazil (Convenção Nacional das Assembleias de Deus 
no Brasil, CONAMAD), also known as Ministério de 
 
49 Radio Senami, http://www.radiosenami.com (accessed 20 
December 2018). 
50 Faculdade Evangelica de Tecnologia, Ciências e Biotecnologia da 
CGADB, http://faecad.com.br (accessed 20 December 2018). 
51 Chesnut, Competitive Spirits (see note 20), 157. 
Madureira, was created in 1989 by splitting off from 
the General Convention. Another important branch 
of the AD is the Assembly of God – Victory in Christ 
(Assembleia de Deus Vitória em Cristo, AD-VC) under 
the charismatic leadership of Pastor Silas Malafaia. 
The boards of all these AD mother churches are ex-
clusively male. 
The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igre-
ja Universal do Reino de Deus, IURD), founded in 
1977 by the former Catholic and self-proclaimed 
bishop Edir Macedo, is smaller (with 8 million mem-
bers, according to its own figures), but is particularly 
visible in Brazil’s public sphere and politics. In con-
trast to the AD churches, the IURD is organised hier-
archically.52 The IURD now resembles a group of 
companies run according to modern management 
and marketing criteria. It includes a media empire 
with numerous medium wave and VHF radio stations, 
which cover most of the national territory. Further-
more, it owns over 20 TV stations, stakes in 100 fur-
ther stations, and the media network Rede Record, as 
well as a publishing house and three daily news-
papers. The inauguration of the IURD’s Salomon 
Temple in São Paulo on 31 July 2014 attracted great 
public attention: a monumental building with room 
for 10,000 believers, it is supposed to be a replica of 
the Temple in Jerusalem. The opening was attended 
by prominent figures from society and politics, in-
cluding representatives of the PT government. The 
majority of the IURD’s assets are said to come from 
donations. 
Even Brazil’s Evangelical elite is not 
resistant to the endemic problem of 
corruption in the country. 
The Church of the Foursquare Gospel (Igreja do 
Evangelho Quadrangular, IEQ) is the third major 
Evangelical denomination in Brazil, and the smallest 
of the three, with less than 8 million members. It 
was originally founded in 1923 by Aimée Semple 
McPherson (“Sister Aimee”) in Los Angeles, California, 
and introduced to Brazil by the couple Harold and 
Mary Williams. Today the church is led by Reverend 
Mario de Oliveira and has more than 11,000 churches 
and congregations throughout Brazil, according to its 
 
52 Ibid. 
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own figures. It is particularly strongly represented in 
the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Paraná.53 
Even Brazil’s Evangelical elite is not resistant to the 
endemic problem of corruption in the country. For 
example: Pastor Silas Malafaia, leader of the AD-VC, 
has been linked to a case of money laundering.54 As 
part of Operação Timóteo,55 the federal police took 
action against a network of corruption concerning 
mining licensing in which Malafaia was allegedly 
involved. The Brazilian public prosecutor’s office also 
investigated Bishop Macedo and other IURD leaders 
for embezzlement. According to the prosecution, two 
letter-box companies were used to transfer funds 
from tax-exempt donations to tax havens and then 
back to Brazil. Over a period of two years, 38 million 
US dollars are said to have been shifted back and forth 
through these channels.56 The accusations made by 
the Federal Police in 2007 against Mario de Oliveira, 
pastor-president of the IEQ and national deputy of the 
Partido Social Cristão (PSC), are even more serious. 
De Oliveira was suspecting of having ordered the 
murder of Carlos Willian de Souza, IEQ lawyer and 
national deputy of the Partido Trabalhista Cristão 
(PTC), in the early 2000s. De Oliveira is said to have 
put pressure on Willian, an elected parliamentarian, 
to give up his mandate in the House of Representa-
tives in favour of the first candidate on the substitute 
list, IEQ pastor Antonio Costa. Willian refused, how-
ever, insisting on his mandate as a deputy, which cost 
him his IEQ membership; he was excluded from his 
 
53 Portal of the Foursquare Gospel Church, http://www. 
portalbr4.com.br/materias/5 (accessed 20 December 2018). 
54 Estadão Conteúdo, “Silas Malafaia é indiciado pela PF na 
Operação Timóteo” [Federal police suspects Silas Malafaia in 
Operação Timóteo], Exame (online), 30 December 2018, 
https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/silas-malafaia-e-indiciado-
pela-pf-na-operacao-timoteo/ (accessed 27 August 2019). 
55 The operation’s name refers to a section from 1 Timothy 
6: 9-10: “Those who want to get rich fall into temptation 
and a trap and into many foolish and harmful desires that 
plunge people into ruin and destruction. For the love of 
money is a root of all kinds of evil. Some people, eager for 
money, have wandered from the faith and pierced them-
selves with many griefs.“ 
56 Gary Duffy, “Pastor brasileño acusado de fraude mil-
lonario” [Brazilian pastor accused of multi-million dollar 
fraud], BBC Mundo (Sao Paulo), 11 August 2009, 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/cultura_sociedad/2009/08/09081
1_2300_brasil_macedo_gm (accessed 20 December 2018). 
Evangelical congregation.57 The Federal Supreme 
Court discontinued criminal proceedings for lack of 
evidence. 
Political Relevance  
The Catholic Church in Brazil can still rely on privi-
leged relations with the state. This is the context in 
which Evangelical actors advocate for the defence of 
individual and institutional religious rights. They are 
also politically committed to securing the position of 
their own denomination within the framework of 
growing Evangelical competition. The Universal 
Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) is particularly 
active in this regard. It thus represents a model to 
which other Evangelical churches increasingly orient 
themselves. Although most denominations tend 
towards an emphatically conservative and traditional 
moral agenda, it is almost impossible to position the 
diverse Evangelical church landscape ideologically. It 
is noticeable, however, that the spiritual authorities 
of the Evangelical denominations increasingly often 
and explicitly take political stances in the run-up to 
elections. The pastors’ public commitment ranges 
from informal support for certain candidates (at times 
from outside their own denomination) to standing for 
election themselves. Evangelical members of parlia-
ment also participate in cross-party cooperations that 
represent their interests. And finally, some Evangeli-
cals try to shape government policy at federal, state 
and city levels by holding executive offices, including 
ministerial posts. 
(In)Equality in Religious Pluralism 
Like other countries in the region, the transition to 
democracy in Brazil in 1985–86 paved the way for 
growing political participation by Evangelical actors. 
The National Constituent Assembly (1987–88) pro-
vided the framework for an initial, still modest politi-
cal commitment. It consisted of both chambers of the 
directly elected national legislature. Of the 559 mem-
bers of the assembly, 32 were Protestants, of whom 
18 were Evangelical (13 AD, 2 IEQ and 1 IURD).58 The 
 
57 Alan Rodrigues, “Marcado para morrer” [Marked to die], 
Istoé, 4 July 2007, https://istoe.com.br/195_MARCADO+ 
PARA+MORRER/ (accessed 27 August 2019). 
58 Freston, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America (see note 10), 24. 
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Evangelical members of the Constituent Assembly 
were committed to achieving equality with the Catho-
lic Church for their denominations. Ideologically, 
they were right-of-centre. But apart from an emphati-
cally conservative moral agenda (for example, against 
the right to abortion and against homosexuality), they 
lacked a clear position on many other issues. 
Despite the principle of equality laid 
down in the Brazilian Constitution, 
the Catholic Church has always 
enjoyed a privileged status. 
Although the preamble of Brazil’s constitution,59 
which was passed in 1988 and revised in 1998, con-
tains a reference to God, it does not confer any special 
status on Catholicism or the Catholic Church. In the 
dogmatic part, the Constitution guarantees the free-
dom of conscience, religion and practice of religion, 
the protection of places of worship and religion as 
well as associated writings and liturgies. Its organic 
section prohibits the state from establishing religious 
cults or churches or subsidising them or entering into 
a relationship of dependence with them. According to 
the Civil Code (2002), religious organisations of any 
denomination are legal entities under private law.60 
Despite this principle of equality before the law 
(isonomy), the Catholic Church in Brazil has always 
enjoyed a privileged status – both de jure and de 
facto. The bilateral agreement between the Brazilian 
state and the Holy See, which was ratified by the 
National Congress in 2009, has established and even 
extended the privileges (for example by permitting 
public grants). This decision met with strong criticism 
in non-Catholic circles. George Hilton, a national 
deputy of the Progressive Party (Partido Progresista, 
PP) and IURD pastor, submitted a draft General Law 
on Religion (Lei Geral das Religiões 5598/2009), which 
extended the provisions of the Agreement with the 
Vatican to churches of all denominations.61 Following 
the large-scale mobilisation of Evangelical deputies, 
the legislative initiative was adopted in the lower 
 
59 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/ 
constituicao.htm (accessed 20 December 2018). 
60 Código Civil Brasileiro, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ 
ccivil_03/LEIS/2002/L10406.htm (accessed 20 December 2018). 
61 Maria das Dores Campos Machado, “Religião, cultura e 
política” [Religion, culture and politics], Religião e Sociedade 
(Rio de Janeiro) 32, no. 2 (2012): 29–56 (32), 
http://bit.ly/2R2OLso (accessed 17 September 2019). 
chamber and passed on to the Senate. There the bill 
was last amended in March 2016 and shelved at the 
end of the 2018 legislative period due to lack of 
activity.62 The election of Jair Bolsonaro and the start 
of the new legislative period in January 2019 should 
have been a favourable juncture for re-debating the 
law. However, this has not yet come to pass more 
than a year later. 
Even though this “major equality project” has 
failed for the time being, Evangelicals have notched 
up smaller political achievements. Following an 
initiative by Cleber Verde, a member of the Republi-
can Party of Brazil (Partido Republicano Brasileiro, 
PRB), and also of the AD, the Brazilian National Con-
gress passed Law No. 12,328 in 2010, which declares 
30 November to be the Dia Nacional do Evangélico.63 
In addition to the many Catholic feast days, Protestant 
citizens now have their own officially recognised day. 
Federal states and cities can decide for themselves 
whether they celebrate the day on the specified date, 
and how (whether it is also a holiday, for example). 
Furthermore, in May 2016, José Serra, foreign minis-
ter in the government of Michel Temer (2016–18), 
issued a three-year diplomatic passport to AD pastor 
Samuel Cassio Ferreira and his wife. Certainly, the 
decree regulating the issue of diplomatic passports 
does not list religious leaders among those to be 
favoured. However, it has been customary to issue 
such passports to Catholic cardinals. The Brazilian 
Foreign Ministry referred to the “national interest” 
and the principle of isonomy (equality before the 
law), which had been enshrined under the govern-
ment of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, as justification for 
the practice now being extended to other denomina-
tions. In 2011 it was decided to grant each denomina-
tion the right to two diplomatic passports.64 
 
62 Câmara dos Deputados, Projeto de Lei 5598/2009, 
http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/ 
fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=441559 (accessed 20 Decem-
ber 2018). 
63 Câmara dos Deputados, “Câmara aprova criação do Dia 
Nacional do Evangélico [House approves creation of National 
Protestant Day]”, 26 August 2009, http://bit.ly/3744vRK 
(accessed 20 December 2018). 
64 The issuing of diplomatic passports is regulated by 
Decree 5.978/06 of 4 December 2006, Article 6, paragraph 3; 
Marina Correa, Os donos do poder – a construção da nomenclatura 
de pastor-presidente nas Assembleias de Deus (ADs) [Powerholders 
– the construction of the nomenclature Pastor-President in 
the Assemblies of God (ADs)]. (2017, unpublished manu-
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Informal and Official Candidates 
Until the 1980s, Evangelical circles in Brazil followed 
the imperative that “believers do not get involved in 
politics”. But with the social and political upheaval 
that accompanied democratisation, Evangelicals in-
creasingly adopted the motto “the believer votes for 
the believer”. Since this change of attitude, the three 
mega-churches AD, IURD and IEQ in particular have 
pursued a corporate model of representation, within 
which they make use of a wide range of options for 
action in elections. They provide “external candi-
dates” with informal support, or promote their own 
candidates for parliamentary mandates and executive 
offices at all levels of state organisation.65 This occurs 
in the context of a highly fragmented party system 
and electoral provisions (such as proportional repre-
sentation in large constituencies with a de facto low 
threshold) that allow a large number of parties to be 
represented in parliament. In the current legislative 
period (2019–23), 30 parties are represented in the 
Chamber of Deputies, with the strongest political 
force, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), having just 
under 11 percent of the seats. 
The Evangelical electorate votes 
according to the proposals of its 
church leaders more than other 
groups do. 
How the informal support for candidates from out-
side a church operates can be observed particularly 
well amidst presidential elections. During the election 
campaign, Evangelical church leaders, above all those 
of the three mega-churches, seek dialogue with the 
presidential candidates and enter into concrete nego-
tiations with some of them – on the left as well as 
on the right of the ideological spectrum. In the most 
successful scenario, they achieve a political deal: the 
prospect of specific legislation and concessions in 
exchange for their church members’ political support. 
Even in Brazil one cannot speak of denominational 
voting in the narrower sense of captive voting; never-
theless, the electioneering that charismatic pastors 
carry out through the liturgy, Evangelical mass and 
social media is not ineffective. A survey conducted by 
the Datafolha opinion research institute in 201766 
 
65 Freston, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America (see note 10). 
66 ”Na hora do voto” (see note 40). 
revealed that only 19 percent of the Brazilian elector-
ate strongly consider the candidates proposed by their 
own church. However, that proportion rises to 26 per-
cent among Protestants and even 31 percent among 
neo-Pentecostal Evangelicals. This religious-political 
allegiance is also attractive to non-Evangelical candi-
dates for the potential votes it represents. Simulta-
neously, it is the basis of Evangelical church leaders’ 
bargaining power, as the following example illus-
trates. 
In the 2014 presidential election campaign, won by 
Dilma Rousseff (PT), Pastor Silas Malafaia, a promi-
nent leader of the AD-VC, posted a tweet in which he 
called on the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) can-
didate, Marina da Silva, to withdraw her promise to 
defend “marriage for all” in the event of electoral 
success. If she did not, Malafaia threatened to make a 
defamatory speech about her. AD member Marina da 
Silva had been Minister of the Environment under the 
Lula government (2003–08) and expressed herself 
liberally on certain moral issues in the run-up to the 
election campaign. She changed tack immediately 
after the pastor’s intervention, returning to the ortho-
dox AD moral agenda.67 
Brazil certainly has parties with a 
Christian orientation, but no 
Evangelical parties in the narrower 
sense. 
In contrast to the informal backing of outside can-
didates, the church’s support for official candidates is 
an act of institutional representation, even though it 
takes place in line with electoral law, i.e. via a party 
list. The general public does not necessarily know 
that a candidate has this additional tie, beyond mem-
bership to a church. Rather, such candidacies – most-
ly for legislative bodies – are launched and promoted 
within religious communities. The candidate’s reli-
gious affiliation is a necessary, but not sufficient, con-
dition. Religious leaders must also be united behind 
the candidate and promote him or her among church 
members. In some cases, primary elections even take 
place within the faith community. Church election-
eering can take different forms; the IRUD, for in-
stance, pursues it with particular, even aggressive, 
emphasis. 
 
67 Oualalou, “El poder evangélico en Brasil” (see note 44), 
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Brazil certainly has parties with a Christian orien-
tation, but no Evangelical parties in the narrower 
sense. The Evangelical political landscape is as frag-
mented as the party system. Nevertheless, Evangeli-
cal candidates predominate in the right and centre-
right. Two political parties have a disproportionately 
high number of Evangelicals: the Republican Party of 
Brazil (Partido Republicano Brasileiro, PRB), which 
renamed itself Republicans (Republicanos) in May 
2019, and the Social-Christian Party (Partido Social 
Cristão, PSC). Both parties distinguished themselves 
in the 2018 parliamentary elections by their large 
number of successful official candidates. The PRB was 
founded in 2003 and received its registration at the 
Supreme Electoral Court two years later. The request 
was made by IURD pastor Vitor Paulo Araújo dos 
Santos. While the IURD and PRB are linked neither 
legally nor statutorily, the party is in fact under the 
political control of the church. This control is largely 
based on personal relationships. About two-thirds of 
the members of the National Executive Commission 
and the National Management Board of the PRB have 
close ties to the IURD.68 
The PSC was founded in 1985 and officially regis-
tered in 1990. It bases its ideological orientation on 
Christian social doctrine and respect for the tradi-
tional moral order. It maintains particularly close 
political ties with the AD. The prominent AD pastor 
Everaldo Pereira was the official PSC candidate in the 
2014 presidential elections, but without success. With 
0.75 percent of the votes, he came fifth. The two (non-
Evangelical) traditional parties that have provided the 
country’s recent presidents, the PT and the Party of 
Brazilian Social Democracy (Partido da Social Demo-
cracia Brasileira, PSDB), have experienced very differ-
ent levels of Evangelical impact. In the period 1998–
2014, the PSDB put forward more than four times as 
many Evangelical candidates as the PT. It has also 
been more successful (by the same ratio) in getting 
them elected.69 
 
68 Fábio Lacerda and José Mario Brasiliense, “Brasil: la 
incursión de los Pentecostales en el Poder Legislativo Brasi-
leño” [Brazil: Neo-Pentecostals enter the Brazilian legislative 
branch], in Evangélicos y Poder en América Latina, ed. Pérez 
Guadalupe and Grundberger (see note 13), 141–79 (167). 
69 Ibid. 
Corporate Parliamentary Work  
In terms of denominational distribution, Evangelicals 
are underrepresented in the National Congress. One 
consequence of the informal and official support for 
mandate candidates, however, is that Evangelical 
interests are articulated more strongly in parliament 
than would be expected. They are represented, for 
instance, by the cross-party Evangelical Parliamentary 
Front (Frente Parlamentar Evangélica, FPE), also 
known as the Evangelical Group (bancada evangélica). 
According to parliamentary rules of procedure, this 
cross-party parliamentary group or caucus is a statu-
tory association of deputies from various parties with 
the aim of pushing through common agenda items. 
To be officially recognised, such a group must bring 
together at least one-third of the members of the 
legislature.70 In the last legislative period, 199 depu-
ties and four senators belonged to the FPE. Most of 
them were members of the IURD and the AD.71 Its 
coordinator was PSC deputy Hidekazu Takayama, a 
well-known AD pastor.72 The current number of 
Evangelical congressional members (deputies and 
senators) varies according to the source. Generally, 
however, it is apparent that more than 20 parties – 
the PRB (21), PSL (7), PSD (7), PR (6), PP (6), DEM (6), 
PSDB (5), and PSC (5) – have Evangelicals in their 
ranks and that at least three Evangelical churches – 
the AD (33), IUDR (17) and Igreja Batista (12) – are 
represented in the National Congress. Among the 
 
70 Câmara dos Deputados, Frentes e grupos parlamentares, 
http://www2.camara.leg.br/deputados/liderancas-partidarias/ 
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Evangelical deputies of the FPE, there are many who, 
as candidates, were able to win the most votes in their 
constituencies. 
In the last legislative period, the FPE explicitly sup-
ported Bolsonaro for president. Moreover, on 24 Octo-
ber 2018, four days before the run-off, it presented its 
manifesto “Brazil for Brazilians”. The 60-page docu-
ment contains an analysis of the country’s political 
and economic situation and a series of market-oriented 
proposals for modernising the state, strengthening 
legal security, and completely restructuring the 
education system.73 Its authors argue for education 
without ideology (Escola sem Ideologia) or education 
without a party (Escola sem Partido), catchphrases 
that have since gained great popularity. They there-
fore oppose the policies of previous PT governments, 
which had advocated gender equality, the criminali-
sation of homophobia, and the legalisation of abor-
tion.74 In line with this conservative moral agenda, 
the FPE launched two legislative initiatives in 2013 
and 2014. The first aims to limit the interpretation of 
the concept of family to the “union between a man 
and a woman” (Estatuto da Familia, Projeto de Lei 
6583/2013). The second aims to end the alleged “cul-
tural Marxist” indoctrination of pupils (Escola sem 
Partido, Projeto de Lei 7180/2014). 
Conservative values can be asserted particularly 
effectively from key positions in parliamentary com-
mittees that deal with social issues. In the last legis-
lative period, 14 of the 36 members of the Human 
Rights Committee were Evangelicals. Their equally 
strong presence in the Committee on Technology 
and Communication (14 out of 42) is because Evan-
gelical churches are keen to have unrestricted access 
to radio and television licenses.75 In 2014, only a 
narrow majority prevented then-Congressman Jair 
Bolsonaro – known for his homophobic and miso-
gynistic statements, and statements glorifying the 
former military dictatorship – from chairing the 
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Commission on Human Rights and Minorities in the 
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.  
An Evangelical President 
In October 2018, the Partido Social Liberal (PSL) can-
didate, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, won the run-off elec-
tion for the office of President of Brazil with the 
motto “Brazil above everything; God above everyone”. 
During the election campaign, Bolsonaro received the 
open support of the cross-party Evangelical Parlia-
mentary Front in the National Congress and of most 
leaders of the major Evangelical churches. Eventually 
a large part of the Evangelical electorate voted for 
him. This support also had an effect on how Bolso-
naro’s cabinet was formed and on his government’s 
actions. In contrast to re-democratised Brazil’s pre-
vious governments, religion – especially Evangelical-
ism – plays an important role in Bolsonaro’s presi-
dency. 
Whether or not Bolsonaro himself 
can be regarded as a “true 
Evangelical” is the subject of much 
public debate in Brazil. 
Whether or not Bolsonaro himself can be regarded 
as a “true Evangelical” is the subject of much public 
debate in Brazil. In May 2016 he was baptised in the 
Jordan River by Pastor Everaldo Pereira, a prominent 
AD leader and president of the Partido Social Cristão 
(PSC); pictures and videos of the ceremony were dis-
seminated on the Internet. His current wife, Michelle 
Bolsonaro, is Evangelical. The wedding was performed 
by the prominent AD-VC Pastor Silas Malafaia. On the 
evening that the result of the second round became 
known, Bolsonaro stepped outside his front door: 
before the president-elect gave a short speech to the 
cameras, the Baptist preacher and politician Magno 
Malta took his hand and said a prayer. Yet some see 
in Bolsonaro’s behaviour the expression of a “Chris-
tian ambiguity” and claim that he never ceased to feel 
Catholic.76 What is noteworthy for this analysis, how-
ever, is less Bolsonaro’s subjective religious beliefs but 
 
76 Lamia Oualalou, “Los evangélicos y el hermano Bolso-
naro” [The Evangelicals and Brother Bolsonaro], Nueva Socie-
dad, no. 280 (March–April 2019): 68–77, https://nuso.org/ 
articulo/los-evangelicos-y-el-hermano-bolsonaro/ (accessed 
23 August 2019). 
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rather the increased significance that Evangelicals can 
achieve through his election victory and leadership. 
Bolsonaro’s Evangelical Support 
Bolsonaro had already declared in his election cam-
paign that (the Christian) God should be given more 
space in politics. He now asserts that the Brazilian 
state is secular, but that Brazil is Christian, and that 
the faith of the great majority of the population 
should not be ignored. During his campaign, Bolso-
naro relied heavily on the Evangelical electorate and 
its religious leaders. This phenomenon is hardly new: 
since re-democratisation, many politicians with presi-
dential ambitions have actively sought the support 
of spiritual authorities and their communities. Some 
have even founded “Evangelical committees” within 
their campaign machinery to gain the favour of Evan-
gelical voters. But Bolsonaro relied on this strategy 
in a particularly visible and successful way. Shortly 
before the runoff election between Bolsonaro and 
his PT rival Fernando Haddad, a Datafolha survey 
revealed that among Evangelical citizens, who make 
up 31 percent of the electorate, Bolsonaro led with 
40 percent approval (compared to 15 percent for 
Haddad). Among Catholics, who represent 55 percent 
of the electorate, the two candidates could count on 
almost the same amount of support (29 percent vs. 
25 percent).77 Six months after the start of his presi-
dency, Bolsonaro received higher approval rates 
among Evangelicals (41 percent) than among Catho-
lics (30 percent) and the non-religious (25 percent).78 
 
77 “Bolsonaro cresce e atinge 32%” [Bolsonaro increases 
and reaches 32%], Instituto Datafolha, 3 October 2018, 
http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2018/10/1982865-
bolsonaro-cresce-e-atinge-32.shtml (accessed 20 December 
2018). 
78 Bolsonaro has higher approval among men (38%) than 
women (29%), among the over-60s (37%) than 16 to 24 year-
olds (27%), among higher earners (52%) than lower earners 
(27%), among entrepreneurs (58%) than workers in the in-
formal sector (25%) and the unemployed (22%), in the south 
of Brazil (42%) than in the northeast (25%), and among those 
who call themselves whites (42%) than those who consider 
themselves brown (31%) or black (25%), Folha da S. Paulo 
and Instituto Datafolha, Avaliação do Presidente Jair Bolsonaro 
[Approval rates for President Jair Bolsonaro], 4/5 July 2019, 
http://bit.ly/2CHXpEB (accessed 27 August 2019). 
The AD and IURD expect the new 
president to pursue a policy 
consistent with their values and 
interests. 
Bolsonaro also counted on the explicit support of 
the two large Evangelical churches AD and IURD. For 
example, Bishop Macedo, IURD founder and owner of 
Brazil’s second largest media network, offered Bolso-
naro the opportunity to give an exclusive interview 
(conducted by a sympathetic reporter) on his tele-
vision channel TV Record, while the other aspirants for 
the presidency debated together on another channel. 
Inter alia, this gave Bolsonaro a strong undisputed 
media presence, which as a member of a party with 
weak parliamentary representation he was not en-
titled to under election law. 
In return for openly backing Bolsonaro, the AD 
and IURD expect the new president to pursue a policy 
consistent with their values and interests. For ex-
ample, the Evangelical Parliamentary Front has urged 
Bolsonaro to make the churches’ fiscal duties more 
flexible. They have already been successful with two 
demands: first, the Internal Revenue Service (Receita 
Federal) of the Ministry of Economy, under pressure 
from President Bolsonaro, lifted the obligation for the 
smaller churches to be added to in the National Regis-
ter of Legal Entities (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas 
Jurídicas, CNPJ); second, the minimum amount of 
daily financial transactions which the churches must 
make public was raised from 1.2 to 4.9 million Bra-
zilian real.79  
The (Religious) Ideological Wing 
of Bolsonaro’s Cabinet 
Since he has been in power, Bolsonaro has strongly 
emphasised his “calling” to the military, not only in 
his self-representation, but also in terms of gover-
nance. On the one hand, the Brazilian president likes 
to say: “I was not born to become president, I was 
born to become a member of the armed forces”. Al-
though he was a parliamentarian without interruption 
from 1988 to 2018 – first for one legislative period in 
 
79 Bernardo Mello and Thiago Prado, “A pedido de evan-
gélicos, Bolsonaro afrouxará obrigações fiscais de igrejas” 
[At request of Evangelicals, Bolsonaro will relax church tax 
obligations], O Globo, 11 July 2019, https://oglobo.globo.com/ 
brasil/a-pedido-de-evangelicos-bolsonaro-afrouxara-
obrigacoes-fiscais-de-igrejas-23793306 (accessed 27 August 
2019). 
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the city council of Rio de Janeiro and then in the 
Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress – he 
regards his former military career as formative. Bolso-
naro enlisted in his last years of school. He attended 
the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN), the 
Brazilian military academy, which he left in 1977 as 
an artillery lieutenant. Bolsonaro was a paratrooper 
in the Brazilian army and is now a reservist with the 
rank of captain. On the other hand, Bolsonaro formed 
a 22-department cabinet at the beginning of his man-
date. Only two are run by women. Of the remaining 
20 men, eight are members of the armed forces.80 
Vice President General Hamilton Mourão, who joined 
Bolsonaro on the double ticket in the presidential 
election campaign, is also a military man. Subordi-
nate positions in the ministries are occupied by mem-
bers of the armed forces (active members as well as 
reservists). A large number of military personnel are 
at the levers of power, particularly in the Ministry of 
the Environment. 
Bolsonaro’s cabinet consists of a 
military, a technocratic and an 
ideological wing. 
Moreover, Bolsonaro has entrusted four Evangeli-
cals, including two religious leaders, to head minis-
tries. He appointed Presbyterian Pastor André Luiz de 
Almeida Mendonça, who had had a long career in the 
hierarchy of the Federal Attorney General’s Office 
(Advocacia-Geral da União, AGU), which has the rank 
of a ministry in Brazil, as its head. Damares Alves, a 
lawyer and IEQ Evangelical pastor, he appointed 
Minister for Women, Family and Human Rights. 
Since then, Alves has provoked floods of outraged and 
mocking reactions in the (social) media, with state-
ments such as: “Attention, attention. New era dawns 
in Brazil: boys dress in blue and girls in pink.”81 “A 
wife must submit to her husband in marriage. In mar-
 
80 Members of the armed forces chair the following minis-
tries: Government Secretariat (Carlos Alberto Santos Cruz), 
Institutional Security (Augusto Heleno Riberiro Pereira), 
Infrastructure (Tarcísio Gomes de Freitas), Mining and Energy 
(Bento Cosa Lima Leite), Health (Luiz Henrique Mandetta), 
Defence (Fernando Azevedo e Silva), Science and Technology 
(Marcos Pontes), Transparency, Tax Supervision and Control 
(Wagner Rosário). 
81 See e.g the Youtube video, “Damares Alves: menino 
veste azul e menina veste Rosa” [Damares Alves: boys wear 
blue and girls pink], https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=mA8gxoxgeBk (accessed 16 September 2019). 
riage, the man is the leader.”82 “Girls in the Amazon 
region are victims of sexual abuse because they nor-
mally do not wear underwear, because they are poor 
and therefore cannot afford panties.”83 The Minister is 
a well-known opponent of the legalisation of abor-
tion, and secular and gender-pluralist sex education 
in schools. The daughter of an IEQ pastor, she sees 
herself as “one of the conservative Christian women 
who have been oppressed, ignored and forgotten in 
this nation”. Alves has announced that she wants to 
reinstate conservative-Christian values that have been 
heavily neglected under the “dictatorship of the left-
wing minority in the media, universities and non-
governmental organisations”.84 She has declared war 
on gender ideology, as it is called in conservative 
Christian circles. 
Alves’ views make the minister part of the so-called 
ideological wing of the Bolsonaro government, which 
is the third group within the cabinet alongside the 
military wing (centred on Vice-President Hamilton 
Mourão), and the technocratic wing (centred on Eco-
nomics Minister Paulo Guedes). The most important 
exponent of the ideological wing, however, is Foreign 
Minister Ernesto Araújo, a Catholic and career diplo-
mat. Other representatives of this camp are Bolso-
naro’s sons Eduardo (national deputy for São Paulo), 
Flávio (federal state deputy in Rio de Janeiro) and 
Carlos (city councillor in Rio de Janeiro). Although 
Bolsonaro’s sons are not members of the executive 
branch, they always comment – mostly through 
social media – on current political events from a 
government perspective.85 All three belong to an 
 
82 André de Souza, “Damares repete que, ‘no casamento, 
mulher é submissa ao homem’” [Damares repeats that in 
marriage the woman submits to the man], O Globo, 16 April 
2019, https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/damares-repete-
que-no-casamento-mulher-submissa-ao-homem-23603765 
(accessed 16 September 2019). 
83 Damares Alves, “Meninas são abusadas por que não 
usam calcinhas” [Girls are abused because they do not wear 
panties], contribution to Brazilian TV broadcast, published 
on Youtube on 24 July 2019, www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=1ttsP9AzF6A (accessed 16 September 2019). 
84 Tobias Käufer, “Jair Bolsonaros Chefideologin ist die um-
strittenste Politikerin Brasiliens”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
19 August 2019, https://www.fr.de/politik/jair-bolsonaro-
chefideologin-praesidenten-frauenministerin-12923162.html 
(accessed 23 August 2019). 
85 Claudia Zilla, “Brasiliens neue Regierung: Ein besorgnis-
erregendes Kabinett”, SWP Kurz gesagt (online), 21 December 
2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/kurz-gesagt/2018/ 
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Evangelical faith community. This does not apply to 
all forces of the ideological wing, but religion does 
play an important role within this group. All repre-
sentatives share the idea that a cultural struggle is 
currently taking place that threatens Christianity. In 
his Internet blog “Metapolitica 17 – Against Global-
ism”, which he is still running after having taken 
office as foreign minister, Araújo made clear his in-
tention to contribute to the liberation of the world 
from globalist ideology. In his view, economic globali-
sation is controlled by followers of a “cultural Marx-
ism” that is an anti-human and anti-Christian system. 
To believe in God today, he claims, means to fight 
against globalism, because its goal is to break the 
connection between God and man, so that man 
becomes enslaved and God becomes superfluous. 
According to Araújo, the metapolitical project is 
primarily a matter of visualising the presence of God 
in political action and in history.86  
Araújo’s worldview is strongly influenced by con-
spiracy theories and anti-Marxist and anti-Communist 
impulses. In his view, a “left-wing project” is being 
pursued in Brazil and throughout the world whose 
aim is to destroy the family, eradicate religion, and 
control language. In line with this, the foreign minis-
ter opposes accepting non-traditional family constel-
lations or gender-pluralistic life styles and secular-
liberal values. According to Araújo, a language sen-
sitive to minorities and gender pluralism must also 
be combated. All these tendencies are ultimately 
“dehumanising”. Moreover, the Foreign Minister 
regards relations between religions as competition: 
“ecumenism à la we are the world”, which many sides 
aspire to, should be rejected because it puts religions 
on an equal footing while also reducing them to mere 
moral systems. The search for the lowest common 
denominator within the framework of an interreli-
gious dialogue usually ends with discrimination 
against or the exclusion of Christianity, Araújo wrote. 
The “political correctness” enforced by atheists, he 
 
brasiliens-neue-regierung-ein-besorgniserregendes-kabinett/ 
(accessed 21 December 2018); Claudia Zilla, “Kein Honey-
moon für Bolsonaro. Das Kabinett ist zerstritten, Gesetze 
kommen nicht durch und die Jugend protestiert – Brasili-
ens rechte Regierung ist unter Druck”, Internationale Politik 
und Gesellschaft (online), 4 June 2019, https://www.ipg-
journal.de/regionen/lateinamerika/artikel/detail/kein-
honeymoon-fuer-bolsonaro-3511/ (accessed 22 August 2019). 
86 Ernesto Araújo, Metapolítica 17 – Contra o Globalismo 
(Blog), https://www.metapoliticabrasil.com/about (accessed 
23 August 2019). 
further claims, has led to a devaluation of language 
and religion. Against this background, he welcomes 
the fact that a debate on religious freedom has begun 
in the world, but especially in the West, because, he 
concludes, all religions are tolerated and protected in 
America and in Europe – except their own, the Chris-
tian religion.87 
President Bolsonaro is cultivating 
very close ties with the Evangelicals. 
The President’s integration performance in the 
cabinet is weak. He is not able to prevail over the 
three wings or in pooling them. Even if he empha-
sises his identity as a soldier above all, his statements 
and actions suggest that he is more part of the (reli-
gious) ideological wing. Bolsonaro was the first Presi-
dent of Brazil to participate in the “March for Jesus” 
in Brasilia and São Paulo in August 2019 together 
with his Head of Cabinet (Ministro da Casa Civil), 
Onyx Lorenzoni. This Evangelical mass event, which 
has been taking place at irregular intervals in various 
Brazilian cities since 1993, is jointly organised by 
several Evangelical umbrella organisations, in Brasilia 
primarily by the Council of Evangelical Pastors of the 
Capital (Conselho de Pastores Evangélicos do Distrito 
Federal, COPEV/DF). This time, the rally’s motto was 
“Together we march for the family and for Brazil”. 
With reference to the Bible, Bolsonaro’s speech de-
fended the ideal of the traditional family consisting of 
a man and a woman, and declared war on sex educa-
tion in school and what he called gender ideology. 
His election success was “practically a miracle”, he 
said, to which the majority of Evangelical pastors had 
decisively contributed. Pointing to an Israeli flag 
waved by the demonstrators, he paid tribute to Juda-
ism as the origin of Christianity, stating that the com-
mon Jewish-Christian tradition was important. Israel 
was a role model he wanted to emulate in Brazil since 
the Israelis were a godly people. 
The Brazilian President sees Israel and its Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as his closest allies. 
Bolsonaro’s sons also have great admiration for the 
country. A 2018 photo on Twitter shows one son in a 
Mossad T-shirt, another in a T-shirt with the inscrip-
 
87 Ernesto Araújo, “Liberdade religiosa, religião liberta-
dora” [Religious freedom, liberating religion], Metapolitica 17 
– Contra o Globalismo (Blog), 20 July 2019, 
https://www.metapoliticabrasil.com/blog/liberdade-religiosa-
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tion “Israel Defense Forces”. In contrast to the pro-
Palestinian policy of the previous PT governments, 
Bolsonaro had already announced in his election 
campaign that he wanted to move the Brazilian 
embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, following the 
example of the USA. This aimed to do justice to the 
importance of the Holy Land in the Evangelical faith, 
pay tribute to the political right, and advance the 
desired rapprochement with the USA. At the end of 
March 2019, Bolsonaro paid a state visit to Israel 
shortly before the parliamentary elections there. To-
gether with the Israeli head of government, he visited 
the Wailing Wall in East Jerusalem. According to the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry, this was a first for an acting 
head of state with an Israeli prime minister.88 But the 
plan to relocate the Brazilian embassy is only sup-
ported by the ideological wing of the Bolsonaro 
government. The military wing and the technocratic 
wing are opposed, fearing that the decision could 
result in economic disadvantages for Brazil. Exports 
to Arab countries could suffer, especially Brazilian 
halal meat, which is currently exported to those coun-
tries for an estimated five billion US dollars a year. 
Meanwhile the project of the embassy relocation 
seems to have been reduced to the establishment of a 
trade mission in Jerusalem, which Bolsonaro never-
theless presents as “the first step” towards complete 
relocation. 
In the cabinet, then, the President, the Catholic 
Foreign Minister and the Evangelical pastor and 
Minister for Women, Family and Human Rights form 
a kind of “Christian Trinity”. These three members of 
the government are most clearly engaged in strength-
ening Christianity in Brazil, also in politics. This reli-
gious thrust is reinforced by the interventions of 
Bolsonaro’s sons and the pressure exerted by the 
Evangelical Parliamentary Front. 
 
 
88 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited the Wailing 
Wall with Netanyahu in March. 
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The strong denominational migration from the Catho-
lic Church to diverse forms of Evangelicalism that has 
taken place in Latin America over the last five de-
cades has not only been accompanied by a shift in 
religious emphasis; it has also led to greater religious 
pluralism and more intense religiosity in society. This 
development is diametrically opposed to the secula-
risation thesis,89 which assumes that religion gradu-
ally loses significance in modern societies. The con-
tradiction applies to all three sublevels on which the 
process, described in teleological terms by the social 
sciences, should take place. 
At the subjective individual level, no decline in the 
significance of religious beliefs and practices can be 
observed in Latin America. There are very few coun-
tries in the region in which the proportion of people 
without faith or without religion is increasing signifi-
cantly. Rather, the most striking trend is the demo-
graphic growth of Evangelical communities at the 
expense of the Catholic Church. Usually, however, 
this is accompanied by an intensification of religious 
identity and a more religious lifestyle. A nominal 
Catholicism gives way to a practised and intensively 
experienced Evangelicalism. 
At the societal level, there is similarly no evidence 
that religious belief is retreating into the private 
sphere. Evangelical churches and their members have 
become recognised and visible actors in civil society. 
Due to their demographic weight, their increased self-
confidence and their intensified focus on the world, 
Evangelicals with a visibly lived religious practice, 
lifestyle and mega-events play a role in the public 
sphere. The new religious pluralism is reflected in 
various areas of society, such as the establishment of 
Evangelical educational institutions, newspapers, 
radio and TV stations, the emergence of an Evangeli-
cal music and clothing industry, and of other lifestyle 
 
89 Mirjam Künkler and Julia Leininger, “Einleitung: Zur 
Rolle von Religion in Demokratisierungsprozessen”, in Reli-
giöse Akteure in Demokratisierungsprozessen: konstruktiv, destruktiv 
und obstruktiv, ed. Julia Leininger (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 
2013), 13–45 (26). 
products for believers. Beyond this “Evangelical 
market” the Evangelical churches legitimise them-
selves primarily in everyday life as problem-solving 
agencies for disadvantaged population groups;90 they 
thus assume social tasks. The increased “customer 
orientation” of churches is accompanied by an indi-
vidualisation and fragmentation of religious offerings. 
The growing segregation of Latin American societies, 
i.e. the spatial separation of social (sub)groups or 
milieus, corresponds to an increasingly segmented 
spiritual market. The religious monopoly of a world 
church with a world view that shapes the whole of 
society is a thing of the past. It has been replaced by 
a variety of religious offerings that are geared to the 
special needs and preferences of different social 
groups. 
On the political institutional level, where Evangelicals 
are still strongly underrepresented – especially 
compared to Catholics – the desire for Evangelical 
churches to influence political developments in the 
country and assume responsibility in state institutions 
is becoming ever clearer. The plea for the separation 
of state and church, which rallied Protestants in the 
19th century with regard to their own protection as a 
minority against the Catholic Church, has today given 
way to a sacredly reformed political commitment. 
However, in the context of growing religious plural-
ism, demands for legal equality and equal political 
treatment vis-à-vis the Catholic Church are once again 
being voiced. Accordingly, more importance is at-
tached to equality than to the separation of church 
and state. It is solely within the framework of a so-
called conservative new ecumenism, which strives for 
the implementation of a moral agenda “for the family 
and for life”, that the Catholic Church changes from a 
rival to Evangelical churches to a cooperative partner. 
This study’s findings concerning Latin America 
particularly apply to Brazil. In the region’s largest 
country, Evangelical involvement in politics and the 
concomitant entanglement of religion and politics is 
 
90 Chesnut, Competitive Spirits (see note 20), 7. 
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well advanced.91 Within a political system plagued by 
marked corruption, it seems legitimate for advocates 
for militant religiosity to proclaim a need to moralise 
politics. However, there have been no positive effects 
as yet; instead, there have been corruption scandals 
involving prominent Evangelical church leaders with 
close ties to politics. 
The “new churches” are seeking access to the politi-
cal arena to represent their institutional interests and 
religious values. Three Evangelical mega-churches 
dominate the religious landscape of Brazil, and espe-
cially its politics: the IURD, the AD and the IEQ. Al-
though adherents of these three religious communi-
ties belong to different parties, they are more fre-
quently found in political organisations of the right 
and centre-right. Two parties, the PRB/Republicans 
and the PSC, are strongly influenced by Evangelical 
church leaders. They also have great mobilising 
power. Although Evangelical churches usually lack a 
developed social doctrine and substantial political 
programs, they are able to influence and sometimes 
even shape citizens’ social and political preferences, 
and bring to bear the conservative values and tradi-
tional understandings of the roles they represent. In 
Brazilian history, only a few Catholic priests used to 
hold parliamentary mandates, though not as repre-
sentatives of the Church. Now, the largest and most 
politically active Evangelical denominations pursue a 
strategy of informally or officially supporting candi-
dates they like. Although Brazil’s Evangelicals do not 
vote as a monolithic bloc, their parishioners follow 
the election recommendations of their charismatic 
church leaders to an above-average extent. 
Once they have won a mandate at the national 
level, the Evangelical deputies of the most powerful 
denominations come together under the umbrella 
of the Evangelical Parliamentary Front (FPE). In the 
highly fragmented Brazilian Congress, where party 
discipline is very weak, religious identity forms a 
centre of gravity for intra-parliamentary cooperation. 
Religious identity therefore sometimes binds mem-
bers of parliament more than that of party member-
ship; the principle of corporative cross-party coopera-
tion prevails over the principle of pluralist represen-
 
91 Ari Pedro Oro, “A política da igreja universal e seus 
reflexos nos campos religioso e político brasileiros” [The 
politics of the Universal Church and its impact on Brazilian 
religion and politics], Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 18, 
no. 53 (Oktober 2003): 53–69 (64), http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ 
rbcsoc/v18n53/18078.pdf (accessed 17 September 2019). 
tation. This cooperation also extends to the relevant 
parliamentary committees. There Evangelical depu-
ties try, inter alia, to secure or obtain economic privi-
leges for their churches. 
No president in the history of Brazil has owed his 
or her electoral success to the support of the Evan-
gelical electorate and the Evangelical church leaders 
as much as Jair Messias Bolsonaro. No head of state 
before him has enjoyed such massive approval from 
the citizens of Evangelical faith. At the same time, 
Bolsonaro is distinguishing himself as a head of gov-
ernment who cultivates close relations with Evangeli-
cals and pleads for a stronger role for religion in 
Brazil in general and in politics in particular. Those 
members of the cabinet who belong to the (religious) 
ideological wing around the Catholic Foreign Minister 
Ernesto Araújo follow suit. 
From a perspective that assumes democracy and 
pluralism to be normative, there are three problem-
atic interactions between religion and politics at the 
empirical level in Brazil (although they are by no 
means generally necessary). First, the demographic 
weight of the Evangelicals is the result of a growing 
(religious) diversity in society; yet the dominant Evan-
gelical churches with their moral agenda oppose any 
policy that recognises the diversity of life styles or 
promotes their equal rights. Second, Brazil’s political 
and economic elites overlap to a large extent. If rich 
businessmen who go into politics or support candi-
dates are at the same time Evangelical leaders of 
mega-churches, then a “Trinity of Power” emerges 
that counteracts the democracy-promoting diffusion 
of power. Although the religious monopoly of the 
Catholic Church with its political privileges is in 
decline, in the longer term it could be replaced by an 
oligopoly of Evangelical mega-churches with charis-
matic leadership. Third, the ideological wing of 
Bolsonaro’s cabinet is dominated by the conviction 
that a worldwide conspiracy threatens Christianity. 
Associated with this is the belief that religions are in 
competition and (more or less explicitly formulated) 
in the supremacy of Christianity, which, however, is 
currently being neglected. These three tendencies 
have a negative impact on peaceful coexistence in a 
pluralistic, open society and on inter-religious dia-
logue. 
From the point of view of ordinary citizens, the 
phenomenon is different. The aforementioned secu-
larisation thesis is based on an understanding of 
modernisation that does not take into account the 
fact that development can go hand in hand with the 
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persistence of poverty and an increase in social in-
equality. Factors such as political, social and econom-
ic instability promote the experience of existential 
insecurity, and consequently the need for eternal 
certainties. The cultivation of conservative values and 
intense religiosity can compensate for situations of 
relative deprivation. Regardless of the question of 
whether or not a sense of the transcendental or 
religious feelings are inherent in human beings, non-
inclusive development models and a state that is 
absent or criminal for many citizens reinforce the 
impulse to search for a “practical spirituality” that is 
also aimed at solving everyday problems and promot-
ing social mobility. Today this need seems to be ful-
filled above all by the Evangelical churches. Many see 
their outreach as the concretisation of God’s work, 
according to Max Weber’s assertion: “Whether one 
should at all try to influence a particular god or 
demon by coercion or by entreaty is the most basic 
question, and the answer to it depends only upon 
proven effect.”92 
A context-sensitive developmental approach to 
Brazil and Latin America in general should take ac-
count of the fact that Evangelical faith communities 
in the region are growing on the fertile ground of 
unequal and unjust development. The Evangelical 
churches have advanced to become relevant social 
and political actors. Some of them, especially at the 
local level, are suitable as interlocutors and partners 
for German and European (development) cooperation. 
Identifying them, however, is complicated by the 
fragmentation and diversity of the Evangelical church 
world; actor mapping based on profound knowledge 
of the milieu will be essential.93 Considering the 
Christian-influenced character of their societies, im-
portant tasks await Germany and the European Union 
in their bilateral and bi-regional relations. They could 
and should contribute arguments to counteract pre-
vailing ideas in some Latin America milieus that there 
is a cultural struggle at work which threatens Chris-
tianity, and against which it has to assert itself. 
 
92 Weber, Economy and Society (see note 1), 427. 
93 Thus e.g. Heinrich Wilhelm Schäfer, Friedenspotenzial von 
Freikirchen in den USA und Lateinamerika. Potenziale und Hinder-
nisse für die internationale Zusammenarbeit (Stuttgart: Institut für 
Auslandsbeziehungen; ifa-Edition Kultur und Außenpolitik, 
2020) https://publikationen.ifa.de/out/wysiwyg/uploads/ 
70%20ifa-edition/friedenspotenzial-freikirchen_schaefer.pdf 
(accessed 14 January 2020). 
Abbreviations 
AD Assembleia de Deus (Assembly of God; Brazil) 
AD-VC Assembleia de Deus Vitória em Cristo (Assembly 
of God – Victory in Christ; Brazil) 
AGU Advocacia-Geral da União (Attorney General’s 
Office; Brazil) 
AMAN Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (Military 
Academy of Black Needles; Brazil) 
CCB  Congregação Cristã no Brasil (Christian 
Congregation in Brazil) 
CGADB Convenção Geral das Assembleias de Deus no 
Brasil (General Convention of Assemblies of God 
in Brazil) 
CNPJ Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas (National 
Register of Legal Entities) 
CONAMAD Convenção Nacional das Assembleias de Deus 
no Brasil (National Convention of Assemblies of 
God in Brazil) 
COPEV/DF Conselho de Pastores Evangélicos do Distrito 
Federal (Council of Evangelical Pastors of the 
Capital; Brazil) 
CPAD Casa Publicadora das Assembleias de Deus 
(Publishing House of the Assemblies of God; 
Brazil) 
FPE Frente Parliamentar Evangélica (Evangelical 
Parliamentary Front) 
IBGEI Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) 
ICC Igreja Cristã Contemporânea (Christian Church 
of the Present; Brazil) 
IEQ Igreja Internacional do Evangelho Quadrangular 
(International Church of the Foursquare Gospel) 
IURD Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (Universal 
Church of the Kingdom of God; Brazil) 
LGBTQ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer 
MORENA Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Movement 
of National Regeneration; Mexico) 
PES Partido Encuentro Social (Social Encounter 
Party; Mexico) 
PP  Partido Progresista (Progressive Party; Brazil) 
PRB  Partido Republicano Brasiliero (Brazilian 
Republican Party) 
PSB Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist 
Party) 
PSC Partido Social Cristão (Social Christian Party; 
Brazil) 
PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Party of 
Brazilian Social Democracy) 
PSL Partido Social Liberal (Social Liberal Party; 
Brazil) 
PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Labour Party; Brazil) 
PTC Partido Trabalhista Cristão (Christian Labour 
Party; Brazil) 
RN Restauración Nacional (National Restoration 
Party; Costa Rica) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
